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RUSSIA'S PART IN THE INITIAL PERIOD OF THE WORLD WAR

THE FUNDAMENTAL IDEAS OF THE STRATEGICAL DEPLOYMENT AND
FIRST OPERATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY IN 1914

BY GENERAL JOURY DANILOFF

NOTE BY THE EDITOR.—General Daniloff occupied the post of Quartermaster General of the Russian General Staff for a period of five years, prior to the outbreak of the World War, and personally directed all of the work connected with the operative preparation of Russia for that struggle. In securing exclusive American rights for the publication of his article, the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE is able to print a most valuable piece of first-hand military history of the greatest interest, particularly for purposes of comparison with the accounts of Ludendorf and of the German General Staff covering the same operations and phases.

The period of the strategical deployment and the first operations of the armies, which have taken part in the World War, 1914-18, must attract the special attention of all those who take an interest in the great epopeia of the recent past. In this period the conceptions, on which in each country the plans for the coming war were founded, were bound to take shape and come out clearly and perceptibly. The first operations on the battlefields necessarily reflected, like in a mirror, the fundamental points of view on modern warfare and the character of conducting wars, as they had been accumulated in the different armies during the long years of peaceful life and labor. Lastly, as we know, the first period of the World War distinguished itself by its movable and manoeuvring character, where there is the widest space for the development of the creative genius in our military art, and in this consists perhaps the most precious part of all for the student of the last war. Actually the picture, describ-

ing the entry into the great World War of nearly all the powers which partook in it, is already sufficiently unveiled. There remains, however, a chain of events, still insufficiently elucidated, especially with regard to their inner importance—the operations on the Russian front during the said period. Of these we find but fragmentary informations in the foreign literature, derived mostly from German sources. As to Russian historiography, it has to work actually under too difficult conditions and is therefore almost silent. Its voice is hardly heard, very much, undoubtedly, to the prejudice of a close and correct study of the events.

The object of this article is to fill up this gap, as far as it is in our power. It has not the pretension of giving a full account of the events, but has been written for the purpose of exposing objectively the conditions of the situation under which the Russian strategical mind had to work during the period, when the preparatory conceptions for war were elaborated and carried out with the beginning of hostilities.

It is known that long before the War, 1914-18, a military convention had been concluded between France and Russia, which later on was confirmed by the political agreement of 1899. The details of this convention were subsequently subjected to discussion and modification in accordance with the eventual changes of the situation at special conferences, where, in the last period preceding the War, the Chiefs of the Staffs of the allied powers used to meet nearly every year.

According to the terms of this convention, a combined action of France and Russia was provided against an attack by Germany or any other power of the Triple alliance, supported by Germany, of one of the contracting parties. This convention was accordingly of a distinctly defensive character. In case of a war with the Triple alliance, Germany was to be considered as the most important adversary; it is against Germany, therefore, that the maximum of the contracting parties' efforts were to be directed, and this within the shortest possible space of time. At conferences, which took place subsequently, the point of view was established as most probable, that at the beginning of the War, Germany would use her main forces against France and proceed to energetic operations against Russia only after a decisive advantage over her Western adversary. To this successive method, Russia and France had to endeavor to oppose

a *simultaneous* counter-offensive from both the opposite fronts, from the French to the east and from the Russian to the west. But considering that the condition of simultaneousness could not be realized, owing to the time required for the mobilization and concentration of the Russian army, it had been pointed out as a leading principle, that the effectiveness of the Russian offensive would increase in the same manner as the rapidity for its delivery could be raised. At the same time all the successive chiefs of the French General Staff, which followed each other in the course of time, insisted on the extreme importance of effecting this offensive against Germany with the largest possible forces. It was expected that this would oblige Germany to retain a considerable part of her troops on her eastern frontier and thereby enable France to meet the main forces of the enemy under the numerically best possible conditions.

This shows that in concluding an alliance with France, Russia, for reasons of common interest, overtook the obligation of foreseeing in her preparations for war the case of a rapid and energetic offensive against Germany, with forces corresponding to the requirements of the situation.

It is characteristic that at these meetings of the allied chiefs of their respective staffs not once the question of the unity of command or even of the correlation of the military operations during the War itself, had been touched. In this delicate, but most important matter, they limited themselves to the elucidation of the means of communicating with each other of the allied staffs, not daring, unfortunately, to go to the bottom of the question.

With every year Germany used to increase her armed forces and improve her military system. Her military power was continuously growing. But on the other hand, to the time of the outbreak of the War, the military and political situation of France had to a certain extent even consolidated and at the same time greatly simplified itself, owing to evident signs, that since 1906-7, Italy was gradually withdrawing from the Triple alliance; this enabled France to take into consideration only a single, though extremely formidable adversary—Germany. With that, the relations between France and England having taken a more friendly character, a military aid from the side of the latter had drawn within the limits of possibilities.

In return, the military and political situation with which Russia had to count, had become more intricate at this same period. For

a long time already the point of view, which the later events were fully to confirm, had been taken up as a certainty, that in the case of military complications on our western frontiers, we would have to deal not separately with Germany or with Austria-Hungary, but with the united forces of both Central Powers, firmly welded to each other by the community of interests and the hostile feelings towards Russia. Under such circumstances it was to be foreseen, that in the case of a collision on our western frontiers, the Russian army would have against her not only German troops, but all, or nearly all, the military forces of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Although Roumania, which had concluded in 1900 a military convention with Austria-Hungary, directed against Russia, began in the course of time to give signs of dissatisfaction with such an arrangement and manifested the desire of establishing more friendly relations with the powers of the Entente, the specific weight of her army has never been overestimated in Russian military circles, and therefore the conciliatory policy of our southwestern neighbor was of no great importance for the military situation of Russia. Much more serious was the fact, that the military power of Austria-Hungary, in the firm and experienced hands of the Austro-Hungarian Chief of the General Staff, General Conrad von Hötzendorf, was continuously progressing and had grown, during the years immediately preceding the War, into a serious offensive force, with which Russia had always more and more to reckon.

Independently of that, Russia had to take into consideration the fact, that the policy of Germany had succeeded in drawing into the orbit of her influence, Turkey; on the other side she had more and more gained the sympathy of large and very influential social circles in Sweden.

The entrance of Turkey into the War highly complicated our situation. It dealt a heavy blow to our foreign trade, rendered extremely difficult the supply from abroad of our army with munitions and war material, in which it was sadly deficient, and constituted a direct military menace to our southern frontiers.

A similar additional danger, only on our northwestern frontier, could be apprehended from Sweden, owing to her geographical situation and her mistrust of Russia's power. It must not be forgotten, that the country disposed of military and naval forces which, though not numerous, were well organized and armed and could always be supported by the powerful German fleet of warships and transports.

The danger of hostile forces landing in Finland in the nearest vicinity of the capital of the Empire—Petersburg, could under such circumstances easily become a fact.

The Russian General Staff had naturally to reckon very seriously with all these unfavorable conditions in their conjointness, in elaborating a plan for the strategical repartition of the military forces of the Empire for the cases of a war on the western frontiers.

A war with the Central Powers of Europe would, by the grandeur of its scale, require the Russian forces and resources to be strained to the utmost. Therefore, in case of political complications with these powers, a general mobilization of all the military and naval forces of the Empire could alone answer the altered situation. Unfortunately the preparedness of our troops was far from satisfying our own desires, notwithstanding the important progresses, obtained in that respect in the course of the last years. The greatness of the distances and the insufficient development of our system of roads in general and railways in particular, weighed heavily on all calculations, referring to the mobilization and the concentration of our military forces on the frontier. Out of the thirty-seven army corps, which Russia could dispose of at the beginning of the War, only twenty-eight could terminate their concentration on the frontier in the course of the first three or four weeks after the issue of the order of mobilization. The remaining nine army corps, quartered in time of peace in Siberia, Turkestan and Transcaucasia, were only beginning to approach the frontier districts after the second month of the War. It is evident, that under such circumstances it would have been absolutely inconsistent to include these army corps in the initial calculations, which concerned only the period of deployment and the first operations. These army corps, which, after their mobilization had been directed to the frontier, were to receive their task in the measure of their arrival, in accordance with requirements, at that moment, of the general situation.

Scheme No. 1.—It is known that the former western terrestrial frontier of Russia, in its central part, protruded in between Germany and Austria-Hungary like a huge and deep wedge, shortening by about 300 kilometres the distance to certain centres of vital importance for our western neighbors. The course of this border line would have afforded great strategical advantages, a point on which our French allies also have on several occasions attracted our attention, but only on one unavoidable condition—that we could outrun

our neighbors in our readiness for an offensive. Alas, this condition was at that time unrealizable. Our adversaries had a considerable advantage over us in the rapidity of their preparations, and were therefore in the position of anticipating our attack by breaking themselves into our territory. These circumstances converted the positive advantages of our so-called "advanced theatre of war" into weighty negative defects.

And in fact, availing themselves of the advantages of the earlier preparedness of their armies, Germany and Austria-Hungary could, at the very beginning of the War, place our unready forces on this theatre in a most critical strategical position, by a combined offensive from East Prussia towards Bialystok and from Galicia in the direction of Brest-Litovsk. The danger of such a manœuvre was so deeply felt, that as early as in 1910, it had been decided to withdraw from Russian Poland a part of the forces, which were quartered there in peace time and, in connection with this measure, to study anew the question of the fortresses on the middle course of the Vistula and the rivers Bug-Narew. Once it had been decided to draw further back, towards the east, the line of our strategical deployment, these strongholds would cease to be in direct connection with our manœuvring forces and therefore lose a part of their former importance.

The difficult situation of our troops on the advanced theatre of war would necessarily be aggravated in the measure in which the numeric forces at the disposal of Germany and Austria-Hungary for such an operation were more considerable. In this respect two distinct situations had to be taken into account, which depended on the procedure of our principal adversary—Germany. And in fact, the geographical situation of Austria-Hungary enabled her to direct all, or nearly all, her forces against Russia. As to Germany, on the contrary, the alliance between Russia and France peremptorily obliged her to divide her forces in the case of a war on two fronts. With that, owing to her central position, two possibilities were at her choice; she could strike with her main forces to the west, or to the east. In evaluating the probabilities of one or the other of these plans, Germany was likely to decide on, it had to be taken into consideration that France was greatly ahead of us in respect to the time required for the readiness of her armies for action; for this reason, during the first period of the War, it is from the side of France, that German territory was principally threatened with an

invasion. In the eyes of the Germans this danger would very likely appear the more serious, owing to the circumstance that their western boundary districts are at the same time the most industrial ones, which in time of war means the most valuable of the whole Empire. For these reasons an irruption of the enemy into these districts would be a calamity of exclusive importance. The best way of warding off this danger consisted naturally in an invasion of France by the Germans themselves, but such a plan could of course only be carried out with great forces. On the other hand, the slowness of our mobilization and concentration at the frontiers, of which, to that, our adversaries had formed an exaggerated opinion, allowed the German General Staff to consider it feasible to leave but small forces on its own eastern front and yet frustrate the offensive of the Russian army by a rapid invasion of our territory by the entire forces of Austria-Hungary. The exposed considerations rendered it more probable in our estimation, which was also that of our French allies, that in the first period of the War, Germany would turn her main forces upon France. In acting in this way, Germany could besides that make it more difficult for England to support her ally—France—and, in the case of a decisive success, even reckon on the possibility of drawing on her side Italy, which at that time had not yet sundered definitely her former ties with the Triple alliance. An attentive study of the railway preparations of Germany, which indicated the intention of rapidly concentrating in the period of mobilization large forces on the Belgium frontier and the observation that the latest works of fortification, undertaken by the Germans, concerned principally their eastern frontier, confirmed us in the correctness of our presupposition. But, of course, with all these considerations, nothing definitely prevented Germany from adopting the second combination—a defensive war on the west and a decisive blow on the east. Before the War, some separate voices in the adverse coalition had already been heard, which advocated such a method. And as the difference of the situation, dependently on what Germany would do, was too acute, the Russian General Staff was obliged to have in readiness two completely elaborated plans, or rather two variations for the strategical deployment of our armed forces: one, providing against the case that Germany should first attack France with her main forces, the other for the opposite solution of the problem. But as the first case was considered by far the most probable one, the corresponding variation of our strategical deployment was estab-

lished as fundamental; it was to be executed automatically, as soon as the order for mobilization had been given and war declared. The transition to the other variation, providing against the less probable, but for us much more dangerous case, was to be effected only on special orders.

The first variation was based on the idea of an offensive on a grand scale, that offered every advantage from the psychological point of view and protected at the same time our own territory against an incursion of the enemy.

Of our two adversaries—Germany and Austria-Hungary—the first was of course considered to be the more important one. Germany was the head and inspirator of the whole, in respect to us, hostile alliance; it was therefore indispensable for us to turn against Germany our principal efforts. But on our way we could not avoid entering into collision with the entire Austro-Hungarian army, which under the given circumstances would represent the principal active hostile forces on our front and deprive us of our liberty of action. It was not before having previously overthrown the Austro-Hungarian forces, that the Russian armies would be in a position of invading Germany on a grand scale and with little risk. A part of that, a military success over the dualistic Monarchy of the Hapsburgs, into the population of which entered about twenty millions of slaves, kin to us by race and sympathizing with us, could possibly cause this power to fall to pieces and retire from the War. Lastly, in striking at Austria, we could expect to relieve considerably the situation of Servia, raise the prestige of the powers of the Entente on the Balkans and cause Italy and Roumania to gravitate towards us.

These considerations were then the reason for which the variation A (Avstria), foreseeing the strategical deployment of the Russian army in the case Germany should turn her principal efforts against France, was founded on the idea of striking a decisive blow at Austria-Hungary.

But in preparing this blow, we did not a single moment leave out of our consideration the dangerous situation which would have arisen for France, being obliged in that case to take on herself the main stroke of the Germans. We did not forget, that it was our duty to come to her assistance as efficaciously as our means permitted. We had also to guarantee our own operations against Austria-Hungary against disturbances from the side of Prussia. Both these problems

could best be solved by an energetic offensive into East Prussia, the natural stronghold for the concentration of the troops, left against us, and by inflicting on them a decisive defeat. This would give us the possession of East Prussia and enable our armies to debouch on the lower course of the Vistula. The advantages of occupying such a position would consist not only in the shortening of our strategical front by more than 300 kilometres, but also in the consolidation of our right flank, or finally thrown too far back. But the most important result consisted in the fact, that, after having reached the lower Vistula, we could move our troops towards the middle course of this river. If, meanwhile, the Austrians had been defeated on the left flank of our general strategical front, the Russian army acquired an exceptionally advantageous starting position for its further offensive in the interior of the country and, to that, in directions, which were most threatening for the enemy. Not only that this would have laid open to our armies the roads to the industrial Silesia, the loss of which would, during the War, have been a heavy blow to Germany, but also those, leading to Berlin, a direction on which the former Chief of the French General Staff and Commander-in-Chief, General, actually Marshal, Joffre very energetically insisted. In the case of this offensive the left flank of our strategical front could have found a point of support in the consanguineous with us Tchechia and Slovakia.

And so, according to the fundamental variation A, which, like every plan for a strategical deployment, did not go beyond the consideration of the initial military problems, the principal stroke of the Russian forces was first of all to be delivered against the Austro-Hungarian army. The region for the concentration of this army was naturally Galicia, where the Austrian General Staff could concentrate from twelve to thirteen army corps, leaving the remaining three or four army corps against Servia. It is evident, that in order to make this stroke effective, all available forces had to partake in the execution of the proposed operation. But, as we have already seen, the Russian General Staff was not free in its decisions concerning this exceptionally important question; it had to take seriously into consideration the common interests and the obligations Russia had overtaken in her capacity of ally.

As has already been pointed out, our ally—France—reckoned to a very great degree on an invasion of Germany by the Russian armies, effected in the shortest possible space of time, should the principal

effort of the enemy be directed against her, as this was expected to force the German General Staff to drain the western front of a certain number of army corps in favor of its eastern theatre of war. According to the estimates of the Russian General Staff, Germany could attack France with her main forces, but nevertheless leave from three to six army corps on her eastern front, especially provided the case, that Italy should side actively with the Triple alliance. These army corps were liable to be reinforced by the addition to them of a certain number of reserve and landwehr formations. At the conferences before the War our allies also thought it desirable, that our invasion of East Prussia should be undertaken with forces, sufficient to ensure us a success against five to six German army corps, supported by reserve divisions. These considerations and desiderata, as well as the necessity of covering Finland and Petersburg against a menace from Sweden, supported by German landing forces, were the starting points in the calculation of our forces, available in first line for an invasion of Austria-Hungary.

Out of the twenty-eight army corps which, as we have seen, we had the means of concentrating on our western frontiers in the course of the first month of the War, not more than sixteen were available, in first instance, for operations against Austria. They were intended to be reinforced, for the presupposed offensive, by a certain number of divisions of secondary formation, notwithstanding that these were not considered sufficiently prepared for an immediate entrance into campaign.

But the restraining conditions, which had to be taken into consideration, did not end here. In consideration of the rapidity, with which, it was presumed, the events would follow each other on the French-German front, it appeared of the utmost importance for a timely relief of our allies, to hasten our readiness for active operations against Germany, be it even to the detriment of the forces on the Austro-Hungarian front. For this reason the armies, destined for an offensive action against Germany, were to consist exclusively of army corps of "accelerated"—in comparison with the others—readiness.

The situation, in foresight of which the variation A of our plan had been worked out, was nevertheless such, that it enabled us to profit, though not to their full extent, of the advantages our advanced theatre of war offered us. These advantages consisted in the possibility of occupying a position, which would envelop the Austro-

Hungarian forces in Galicia and the German armies in East Prussia, should they effect there their concentration. Under the actual conditions this decision was the more recommendable for the reasons, that on the one hand, Germany had directed her main forces against France, leaving before us only a probably not very solid screen, on the other, we had succeeded in forming a sufficiently strong front against this same Germany, and to that, composed of troops of accelerated preparedness. These circumstances allowed us to be confident, that we would be able, not only to keep firmly our grasp on the region Bialystok-Grodno, which was of the highest importance for our position on our advanced theatre of war, but even to carry our offensive operations into East Prussia, in turning the Masurian Lakes from the west. As to the danger of an irruption into our advanced theatre of Austro-Hungarian forces, it was to be paralyzed first of all by an energetic offensive from our Kiev front, and besides by the formation of an especially solid group of troops in the zone of the most dangerous direction for us—the direction on Brest-Litovsk.

In accordance with all these aforementioned considerations the variation A took the following concrete forms:

All the forces, designed for offensive operations against Austria-Hungary, formed the "southwestern" front (General Ivanoff) and were to develop into two groups: two armies (Fourth, General Baron Salza, and Fifth, General Plehve), seven army corps in all—on the southern sector of our advanced theatre—and two other armies (Third, General Rouzsky, and Eighth, General Broussiloff), with a total force of nine army corps on the Kiev sector of the general front.

The armies of the southwestern front were to crush the Austro-Hungarian forces, concentrating in Galicia; as a consequence of their defeat Galicia and the passes leading from there to the plain of Hungary would fall into our hands.

The principal blow was to be dealt by the armies of the Generals Rouzsky and Broussiloff. For this reason special attention had been paid with regard to their numeric force and early readiness.

Against Germany two armies, with nine army corps in all, were to deploy, the First army (General Rennenkampf), consisting of four army corps, in the region westward of the middle course of the river Niemen, and the Second army (General Samsonoff), counting five army corps, on the Bober-Narew sector of the said front. Both

these armies were united in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief of the "southwestern" front (General Jilinsky).

These two armies had received a common task, they were to defeat the German armies, concentrated in East Prussia, and, after the conquest of this province, to debouch towards the lower course of the Vistula. In accordance with this plan the First army was to prepare for an advance, in turning the Masurian Lakes from the north, and the Second, in leaving the region of the said lakes to the east.

Among these six armies, destined for active operations, in accordance with the task they had to perform, a repartition had been made of nearly all the cavalry divisions and brigades we maintained in time of peace; the same had been effected with regard to the divisions of secondary formation, which were, however, intended to perform but auxiliary service during the first period of the campaign.

By the described repartition of our forces amongst both our offensive fronts, we secured only a slight numeric superiority over the Austro-Hungarian armies. The authors of this plan could not fail to draw their attention on this, its weak point. But no other solution seemed to have been possible. Once she entered into an alliance, Russia no more considered herself independent in her decisions. The alliance imposed duties and each of the parties engaged was to have sufficient firm will to subordinate its own actions and objects to the common interests. Everyone, who has gone through a war, knows how fatally on a common design is reflected the participation of an unreliable member or neighbor. Russia did not admit that as a result of her shifting from the obligations she had taken on herself, the situation on the front of her ally should become still more serious than it had been anticipated. In reducing her forces, designed for dealing a blow at Austria, Russia hoped to compensate their numeric insufficiency by their heroism and their superiority over the enemy * * * .

The weakness of our Baltic fleet and the unreadiness of our naval position, Reval-Nordkalaud, which, with the coöperation of the first, was intended to prevent a hostile fleet from entering into the Finish Gulf, rendered our situation on the nearest approaches to the capital and in Finland extremely unstable, especially considering the uncertain course of Sweden's policy before the War. For this reason it had been decided, so long as this situation was not cleared, to retain in Finland and the region of Petersburg three army corps, united into

a Sixth army. The Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaivitch was to take the command of this army, but when war had been declared *de facto*, the Grand Duke was called to the high and responsible post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Empire, belonging to the active armies.

After the political situation had become clear and second-category divisions, capable of relieving the field troops, had been formed, these three army corps were to be sent to the western front, which then subsequently, also has been effected.

Finally, on the southern frontiers of the Empire, contiguous to Roumania and the Black Sea, in view of the impossibility of foreseeing Roumania's and Turkey's attitude, the formation of a Seventh army (General Nikitin) had been projected, composed exclusively of units of secondary formation, for the purpose of observation.

Remain to be said some words on the variation G (Germania), which was to enter into effect in the less probable, but yet admissible case, of Germany's decision to transfer, in the very beginning of the War, considerable forces to her eastern front. In such a case Russia would have had to meet the united forces of both Central Powers, not only outnumbering the Russian armies, but with the enormous advantage on their side of earlier readiness. It is evident, that we could not reckon on the possibility of preventing them from invading our territory, and therefore, before all other considerations, the plan for our strategical deployment had to be founded on its safety. The situation, in that case, imperiously exacted a deeper withdrawal of our zone of deployment into the interior of the country. The defence of our advanced theatre would have become an impossibility, owing to the fact of its being closed around from all sides by the enemy. The whole first period of the War was to bear a defensive character until the arrival of all our forces from Siberia, Turkestan and Transcaucasia, or a change in the general situation in consequence of events, happened on our allies' front in the west. Under these circumstances the disuniting importance of our Polessia, which even in our days renders to the utmost, difficult military operations on a large scale, manifested itself most ostensibly. As from the side of our adversaries the principal and shortest roads, leading to both capitals—Petersburg and Moscow, the vital centres of the whole country—pass to the north of Polessia, it had been decided to concentrate the main forces on the northern sector of the general front. Out of the twenty-eight army corps (Sixth, Fourth, First and Fifth armies, with

the addition of one army corps from the Eighth army) were to concentrate to the north of the river Pripet and only eight to the south, with the object of covering the roads to the Dnieper.

The transition from variation A to variation G had been worked out in such a manner, that it could be effected without provoking any painful symptoms. The whole problem consisted solely in the timely disclosure of the projects of Germany, which with a well-organized system of observation could not long remain concealed.

And in fact, the Russian Supreme Command (Stavka), having organized such a system on the transport of the German troops, soon had in hand irrefutable proofs that the main forces of Germany were hurried to the west. For these reasons the variation A for the strategical deployment of our armies, which had entered into effect from the very first day, was carried out to the end, but naturally with such alterations, as a more detailed insight into the situation required, and to which we will refer later on.

According to informations, received by the Stavka, the offensive of our armies in general and the invasion of Germany in particular, was awaited by our allies, France and Great Britain, which had rallied to our cause, with unconcealed anxiety. Our military attaché in Paris, Count Ignatieff, telegraphed on the very first days after the declaration of war, that the French Minister of War had expressed him his hopes, that all the efforts of Russia would be directed against Germany, and the Austrian army considered as a *quantité négligeable*. The French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Mr. Paléologue, addressed himself personally to the Emperor Nicolas II with the urgent entreaty of a speedy offensive. The Russian Ambassador in Paris, Mr. Isvolsky, also reported on the "feverish" impatience with which, according to his opinion, the offensive of our armies was awaited, and added, that a disappointment in that respect would make a very unfavorable impression.

As has already been pointed out, an offensive entered also into our own plans. As to the term, when this offensive could be started, the following circumstances had to be taken into consideration: arguing from the point of view of the common plan of the allies, and as yet purely theoretically, an offensive with the object of diverting the greatest possible hostile forces from another front, ought to precede the decisive operations on the latter. But practically, of course, there could be no question of carrying such a plan into effect, owing to the unfavorable conditions of the mobilization and concen-

tration on the frontiers of the Russian forces. We were not only incapable of taking the lead in opening the campaign, but could not even consider ourselves ready for military operations of any importance by the time the French army was ready. Already at the last conference of the Chiefs of the Staffs of both allied powers, which took place in 1913, the Chief at that time of the Russian General Staff, General Jilinsky, later Commander-in-Chief of the north-western front, declared to General Joffre, that the concentration of the Russian forces, destined for operations against Germany, would be terminated in its principal outlines, only on the fifteenth day of the mobilization, and that the offensive of this group could not commence before that day. As will be seen later on, this promise was held with the punctuality the circumstances permitted.

On the first days following the declaration of war the Stavka had already received positive informations, that not only the II German army corps (Stettin), but also those from our frontier districts, V (Posen) and VI (Breslau), were actually embarking and being transported by rail to the west. This made it clear that the danger of a German descent on our Baltic coast no more existed and that we could reckon on meeting in East Prussia only three local army corps (I, XVII and XX), with a certain number of reserve, landwehr and landsturm formations. These data permitted us to proceed immediately to the transfer of the three army corps of the Sixth army to our western terrestrial frontier; only one army corps (XXII) was temporarily to remain in Finland, until a more positive precision of Sweden's attitude became possible. A further deduction from these data spoke in favor of the timeliness of more energetic and rapid operations from our side in East Prussia. We could not let slip the opportunity of profiting of the relative weakness of our enemy on the spot, for carrying out our designs on that theatre of war, because in the course of some time the Germans might succeed in improving their position, be it by sending up to this front new formations, be it by transferring part of their forces back to the east, after having successfully solved the initial military problems on their western frontier. At the same time it was our duty to come to the assistance of our allies in the west, and this had to be effected the more rapidly and efficaciously, the heavier the blow was, that was to be dealt them.

These considerations decided the Stavka to insist on an unde-

ferred invasion of East Prussia by the armies of the northwest-ern front.

As to the Austro-Hungarian front it had been possible, by the middle of August, to establish, that beyond the river San and on the front Jaroslav-Lvov (Lemberg) considerable Austrian forces had been massed. In eastern Galicia the situation appeared less clear; still it was possible to presume, that the enemy here was in his stage of deployment, under the cover of the rivers Western Bug, Zlata Lipa and Dniester. It must be remarked that notwithstanding the intrepidity and self-denial of our aviators, the insufficiency of our means and the imperfectness of the machines, rendered it impossible to accomplish deep reconnaissance, without which the data on the general disposition of the enemy's forces will always be more or less doubtful. Nevertheless the informations we had received, together with the delay required for the readiness of our Fifth, and especially Fourth armies, spoke in favor of the probability, foreseen already in time of peace, of an Austrian onslaught on these armies. In order to paralyze this danger and at the same time snatch the initiative out of the hands of the enemy, the Stavka insisted energetically on an undeferred invasion of Galicia by our Third and Eighth armies in the direction of Lvov. In case of success these armies would come out on the flank, and even the rear of the Austrian group, in its advance towards the north, and its situation would become the more critical, the deeper it had penetrated into roadless Russian Poland. Independently of that, the advance of our Third and Eighth armies advantageously straightened the line of our strategical front and brought nearer to each other all the four armies of the southwestern front. This diminished the danger of its rupture, arising from the woody and marshy territory between the upper course of the Western Bug and the river Styr.

Lastly, on the left bank of the Vistula, from the very first days of the War, an advance of German and Austrian forces, in the general direction of Lodz-Kielczy, had been noted. Our advanced units—cavalry and rifle regiments—were gradually falling back towards the middle course of the Vistula in skirmishing with the enemy. The Stavka, by the way, attached to this offensive only the importance of a demonstration.

Besides that our position on the middle course of the Vistula, weak though it was in the beginning, could but improve with every day. It has already been noticed above, that in consequence of the

informations obtained on the repartition of the German forces, the Stavka had as soon as the middle of August considered it possible to proceed to the transfer of two of the army corps, belonging to the Sixth army, to the western front. These two army corps (Guards and XVII) were to concentrate in the region of Warsaw. Another army corps was to be added to them—the I of the First army, which it had been considered possible to take from the armies of the north-western front in reason of their great numeric superiority over the German forces in East Prussia. These three army corps were to form a new, the Ninth army (General Letchitsky), with the object of developing on a larger scale the proposed active operations on the left bank of the Vistula, against the German or the Austrian front, according to the circumstances. This army was to remain temporarily at the disposition of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who foresaw with great perspicacity, that, under the conditions of modern warfare, troops which partake in active operations, rapidly lose their offensive energy and easily get worn out. Fresh forces are required for developing the operations and carrying them out to the end.

To finish with the survey of the situation, as it presented itself in the initial period of the War, it must be noted, that to the south of the Ninth army, which by the way covered the approaches to the river Vistula from the front Cracow-Posen, a fortified position had hastily been thrown up at Ivangorod, on the left bank of the Vistula, at a sufficient distance from the bridges, which at that place cross the river. This position, which had been constructed by one of our most experienced military engineers (General Schwarz), according to the most recent requirements of modern fortification and gradually completed in the sense of answering the wants of the army, could fulfil its strategical task much better and more amply, than the obsolete forts of the former fortress of Ivangorod, which had been cancelled shortly before the War.

On August 17th, the eighteenth¹ day after the issuing of the order of mobilization, the First Russian army crossed the German frontier; three days later the territory of Austria was entered by forces of the Third and Eighth armies. Herewith began the practical execution of the offensive operations, foreseen in our plan of war.

The Commanders-in-Chief of the two fronts were, according to the law, precising their rights and duties, entirely independent military

¹ The sixteenth day of the French mobilization.

chiefs, within the limits of the task given them and the means put at their disposal. This being so, the rôle of a commander-in-chief, who would not wish, by his interference, to restrain the initiative or the creative genius of his immediate subordinates, shrinks almost to the limits of giving them general directives for the task, entrusted to them, and of putting at their disposal the corresponding means. I think that the experience of the last war has proved the imperfection, in many respects, of such a system, by which the personal influence of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the immediate course of the events, and consequently on the results of the most serious operations, is unnecessarily curtailed. However, so long as these conditions existed, there was no other way to follow without running the risk of undesirable results from the interference of the supreme command in matters concerning directly the rights and duties of his nearest assistants. In accordance with the described regulations the planned operations on the northwestern and southwestern fronts were executed directly by the respective Commanders-in-Chief. The influence of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief made itself felt only in the measure in which he disposed of supplementary resources—troops and material.

A coherent and exhaustive description of the events on the different fronts lies beyond the limits of this article; for the purposes it pursues, it will be sufficient in the sequel to touch on this side of the question in its general and striking outlines.

Before the Russian student of the past events involuntarily arises the question, which requires an answer: how could it happen, that the offensive operation in East Prussia, which had been correctly conceived and, considering our considerable numeric superiority, seemed to be safe, ended with a catastrophe? One can say *a priori*, that we must state here a series of fatal mistakes in the way the operations were conducted, for the results of the most unlucky battles could not have given such a tragical turn to the events.

Two days after the First Russian army had entered the territory of East Prussia, in the region Kauschen-Gumbinnen-Goldap, its advancing columns encountered the Germans, which numerically were not inferior to them and had the advantage of being provided with heavy artillery, which we missed altogether. After a stubborn battle of two days, at 16 o'clock of August 20th, the Germans were compelled to retreat, leaving behind them their wounded, war matériel and even guns. Together with the German troops a wave of fugitives

fled from their homes. It made the impression as if the Germans had decided to evacuate the whole of East Prussia. This was the way the Commander-in-Chief of the northwest front understood the situation and we now know, that it had really been the intention of the Commander of the Eighth German army, Baron Pritwitz von Gaftron.

But, having gained a victory over the Germans, the Commander of the First Russian army did not understand, that in the interests of the entire operation it was indispensable to retard the retreat of the enemy by further offensive engagements, or at least by launching in pursuit his numerous cavalry, in expectation of the results of the turning movement General Samsonoff was executing with the (his) Second army. As if nailed to the spot by the fear of a counter-attack from the side of the fortress of Königsberg, which disposed of free communications with the rear by rail and water, and in expectation of the arrival of his own reinforcements,² it is only on the 23d of August that General Rennenkampf continued his offensive.

Meeting hardly any opposition, he reached with his army corps the line riv. Deime-Friedland-Bartenstein-Bischofsteir on the 30th of August, the very day of the almost total encirclement of the greater part of General Samsonoff's army northward of the line Neidenburg-Willenberg. And thus, in the course of nearly ten days since the end of the battle of Gumbinnen, the First army advanced on the whole not more than 80-100 kilometres and was distant by two to three days' marches from the place where the catastrophe of the Second army happened. Such slowness, and especially the loss of the first two to three days, enabled the new leaders of the Eighth German army, the Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorf, to remove nearly all their forces from the front of the First Russian army and, thanks to the highly developed system of communication, to throw the forces taken from there against the army of General

² On August 22nd the II army corps was included into the forces of the First army. Up to that time it had formed the right flank of the Second army and advanced from Augustowo towards the front Lötzen-Johannisburg. This corps, which in time of peace was quartered in the region of Grodno, was intended, during the period of the deployment of the army, to cover the roads to Grodno and the upper Bober. These roads led to the region of the deployment of the Second army; therefore the II corps was temporarily included into the forces of that army. With the development of offensive operations, this corps naturally gravitated towards the I army.

Samsonoff, aiming at both its flanks. As we now know, there had been transferred by rail—the I German Army Corps to the region of Deutsch-Eylau and the Third division of reserve through Allenstein to Hohenstein to the purpose of reinforcing the XX German corps, which had been left in place. The remaining two army corps, first reserve and XVII were marched to the front Allenstein-Passenheim. As to General Rennenkampf, there remained before him: the garrison of the fortress of Königsberg and to the south of the latter, some cavalry with unimportant units of landwehr and landsturm formations.

The Second Russian army of General Samsonoff, being somewhat behind time, passed the southern frontier of East Prussia with the main forces on August 21st and 22d. During its advance through Russian Poland it had to overcome great difficulties, owing to the fatiguing sandy roads, long marches and the unreliability of the rear. There were hardly any local means of conveyance and the attempt to organize the supply of the army met with a failure. The troops suffered from want of bread and forage, so that they crossed the frontier considerably tired out. The army corps advanced in the following order, counting from right to left: II, VI, XIII, XV and XXIII, the cavalry on the flanks. Already during the march of his army through Russian Poland, General Samsonoff had manifested a tendency of inclining the front of his army more to the west, with the object, as he explained, of enveloping the enemy's flank more deeply and at the same time of getting nearer to the railroad Novogeorgievsk-Mlava, what would facilitate the transport of the supplies for the army. Subsequently this tendency confirmed itself in the mind of the Commander of the Second army, owing to the news of the supposed hasty retreat of the Germans to the lower course of the Vistula after their defeat of Gumbinnen.

Taking into consideration that, in swerving from its original direction, the Second army would either still more draw out its front, which, as it was, seemed already too much extended, or break away from the First army, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, in order to forward General Samsonoff's plan of a deeper turning manœuvre, ordered the I army corps to move from Novogeorgievsk to Mlava and to enter into the lists of the Second army. This measure tended at the same time to strengthen the position of the army on its left flank, from the side of Thorn, and to make up its effective force, which otherwise would have been weakened by the detachment

of the II corps to the First army, what was to take place with the beginning of the offensive operations.

On August 23d, in the centre of the Second army, a battle of two days began, fought by the XV army corps against parts of the German XX corps, reinforced by landwehr formations on the front Orlau-Frankenau-Michalken.

The Germans, being attacked on their front and threatened by a turning movement of the neighboring XIII corps, finally retreated in haste towards the northwest. This event drew General Samsonoff still more to the left, and by August 25th, for its further advance the army had definitely taken the direction on the front Allenstein-Osterode, instead of that of the front Rastenburg-Seeburg, as had been originally decided. In order to remain in communication with the First army and to cover his inner flank, which had considerably broken away from the latter, General Samsonoff moved his right flank corps (VI), with the cavalry division attached to it, to the region of Bischofsburg-Sensburg.

The consequence of these measures, effected by the bye with the approval and knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief of the northwest front, General Jilinsky, were very disadvantageous. In turning his front away to the west for two or three days' marches, General Samsonoff created a situation which, instead of giving him a chance of coming down himself upon the flank and rear of the German army, which had been defeated at Gumbinnen, more and more exposed his own right flank and even his rear, to a stroke from the side of two German army corps (I reserves and XVII), which had effected a new manœuvre. At the same time his right flank corps (VI) had broken away from the central group of the army to a considerable distance, thus weakening the offensive power of the main forces and exposing itself to the risk of being beaten in detail.

In the course of the following days the situation of the Second army was becoming more and more critical. Already on August 27th the central group of General Samsonoff's army (XV and parts of XXIII and XIII) met with a stubborn resistance of the Germans, who had concentrated to the southeast of Osterode up to five infantry divisions and brought up to their new front their heavy artillery. The intended rupture of the enemy's front met with a failure and our army corps were unable to advance beyond the line Allenstein-Hohenstein-Mühlen-Frankenau. On the right flank of the Second army the VI corps had been attacked by the XVII German corps,

supported by the I reserves, met with a serious reverse and been driven back to the south of Bischofsburg. This retreat opened to both the aforesaid German corps the roads, turning the right flank and leading to the rear of the central group of the Second army. At the same time the left flank corps, First, which during the wheeling movement of the Second army to the northwest represented the pivot of the whole manoeuvre and had got as far as Usdau, had also been attacked by parts of the I German corps and the landwehr detachment of General Mühlmann, coming from Thorn. This army corps did not attempt to resist to the last, but retired to the south of Soldau, thereby opening the road through Neidenburg-Muschaken, leading to the rear of that same central group of the Second army, but here from its left flank. Lastly, in consequence of the very slow advance of the First army and the gradual swerving of the Second army to the west, the distance between the inner flanks of the two armies, as we have seen, increased to some dozens of kilometres, so that the army of General Samsonoff found itself in an entirely isolated position.

By the evening of August 28th, the critical situation of his army unveiled itself before the eyes of General Samsonoff in all its ominous reality. In this emergency he gave orders to the central group of his army corps to retreat in the direction of Willenburg and Janov, but the time for such a movement had been allowed to pass away. The enemy's circle round our armies, which by that time had already begun to take form, contracted more and more, until by August 30th, it closed altogether. In addition to that, during the last episode of the tragedy the general direction had been lost, in consequence of the breaking down of every kind of communication. The daring attempts of separate columns to cut their way through the lines of the enemy ended for the greater part with a failure.

On this, for the Russian armies' so-fatal day of August 30th, in the woods northward of the causeway Neidenburg-Willenburg, had ceased to exist and could only much later be restored: the XIII and XV army corps and the greater part of the XXIII corps. And not far from Willenburg found his eternal rest the gallant leader of the Second Russian army, General Samsonoff, not wishing to outlive the disaster which had befallen him * * * .

Leaving aside a whole series of secondary questions, as well as a critical examination of the measures taken by the German leaders, we must come to the conclusion, so far as the still incomplete materials

concerning the said campaign permit, that the principal reasons, which led to the catastrophe of General Samsonoff's army, were the following: the slowness and indecisiveness of General Rennenkampf's operations, which were the principal reasons for the isolated position the Second army fell into; the swerving of General Samsonoff's army from its initial direction to the northwest, by which its right flank was uncovered and the overhasty retreat of the I corps towards the south, laying open the road to the rear of the Second army in turning its left flank. It is with a bitter feeling that it must be stated, that all this was in first line the result of a false understanding of the situation and the absence of a leading hand in directing the operations.

The failure of our offensive operations in East Prussia dealt a cruel blow to our general strategic position. It had already been understood, that an offensive of the Russian armies into the interior of Germany would be feasible only on condition of the safety of their right flank, drawn up on the lower Vistula. This object had not been attained. But that was not all. The temporary annihilation of the Second army opened the whole Narew front to a German invasion of Russian Poland. Meanwhile, on the southern sector of our advanced theatre of war, between the Vistula and the Bug, fierce fights with the Austrians were going on, who, as will be seen later, had planned a blow against our Fourth and Sixth armies. Under such circumstances the rear of these armies was seriously endangered. It required much tenacity and determination from the side of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for deciding all the more to pursue the active operations against the Austrians until their victorious end.

Scheme No. 3.—The offensive of our Third and Eighth armies, with which we opened our operations against Austria, took from the beginning a very favorable turn. In advancing, both these armies occupied a tract of land, lying from the line Loutsk-Kamionka southwards to the Dniester. Like that, as these armies drew nearer to the enemy, their front was gradually and considerably shortening. In order to cover his left flank against any attempts from the other side of the Dniester the Commander of the Eighth army held back in echelon his left flank corps (XXIV).

On August 26th, both advancing armies began to draw up on the line Kamionka-Busk-Monasterzyska, where for the first time they encountered the main forces of the Third Austro-Hungarian army

under the command of General Brudermann. After a battle of two days, known under the general name of the battle on the Zlata Lipa, the enemy, having sustained heavy losses and threatened to be turned on both his flanks, retired towards the west, pursued by our cavalry.

Positive informations that the Austrian forces on their southern front did not exceed three to four army corps, only confirmed us in our supposition, that the main forces of the Austro-Hungarian armies were to be expected on their northern front. This circumstance caused the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to order a partially new groupment of the forces of the southwestern front. Accordingly the III Caucasian army corps, which was just coming up by rail to the theatre of war and was originally destined to enter into the Third army, was directed towards the Fourth army, where meanwhile the events had taken for us a serious turn.

This is what had happened: The Austrians, profiting of their earlier readiness, crossed, in the course of August 21st and 22nd, the rivers San and Tanev and invaded our territory with large forces. Already on August 23rd the army of their left flank (First army, General Dankl) collided with advanced units of our Fourth army on the front Krasnik-river Por. This collision was the result of a general offensive, assumed on that day by our Fourth and Fifth armies, in compliance with the instructions of the Commander-in-Chief of the southwestern front, General Ivanoff, on the front Vilkolaz-Vladimir-Volynsk. And so, both sides had manifested the desire of assuming the offensive justly evaluating the advantage it offers from the point of view of the initiative.

The battle which followed ended to our disadvantage and the Fourth army was obliged to throw back its right flank. During the next days the Austrians continued their attacks on the front of our position, but their principal effort was directed towards Opole, with the object of developing their advantage over our right flank. In order to arrest this turning movement, which threatened the Fourth army, and to close the gap, which had opened between its right flank corps and the Vistula, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was obliged to turn in haste the XVIII army corps from its march on Warsaw and direct it on Ivangorod, placing it under the command of the Fourth army.

On the day of the first serious encounters on the front of our Fourth army, the Fifth army of General Plehve, advancing eastwards of the first, was marching up to the front Zamostie-Sokal. As

the enemy did not show himself before this army and in consideration of the critical position of the Fourth army, the Commander-in-Chief of the southwestern front drew the attention of General Plehve on the necessity of relieving the neighboring army out of its critical situation by a change of the direction given to the three army corps of the left flank of the Fifth army, so that they might come up to the flank and rear of the hostile forces, of those as well, which were attacking the Fourth army, as of those which newly had been sighted in the direction of Tomachov-Zamostie.

Unfortunately, owing to the general strategical position, this manœuvre could give no relief to the Fourth army and only put in a difficult situation the advancing corps of our Fifth army. As they were moving up to the new front Zamostie-Tomachov, they exposed their left flank to an attack from the side of the Fourth Austro-Hungarian army of General Auffenberg, which was advancing to the east of the First Austro-Hungarian army of General Dankl and in echelon rearwards with regard to the latter. Besides that, in swerving from their original direction towards the west, the corps of the left flank of the Fifth army were drawing away from the right flank corps of the Third army, which was advancing, as we have seen, towards the Kamionka. And lastly, the difficult situation into which the Fifth army had got, was still more aggravated by the circumstance, that the corps which occupied the right flank of that army (XXV) and was directly engaged in support of the Fourth army, had been forced, under the pressure of the events on the front of the latter, to retire towards the north, in the direction of Krasnostav, thus being severed by a considerable distance from the other corps of its own army.

With the 28th of August, a series of hard days set in for the Fifth army. Over five Austrian army corps, under the supreme command of General Auffenberg, endeavored to close around from three sides on the three corps of the left flank of our Fifth army. In the region of Tomachov a series of stubborn battles took place, in which much gallantry had been displayed, but with the final result, that the Commander of this army considered it nevertheless advisable to commence the retreat of these corps towards the crossings of the river Western Bug on August 31st.

But more critical still had become in those days the situation on the front of the Fourth army. In the night on August 29th, an Austrian army under the command of General Kummer, which till

then had been advancing on the left bank of the Vistula, on Radom, having bridged that river at Iuzefov, began to cross over on the other side. Following the Austrians, the general landwehr corps of General Voirsch equally passed over on the right bank of the Vistula. After the arrival of the expected reinforcements, the Austrian leaders proceeded to the execution of a vast enveloping manœuvre round both the flanks of the Fourth army. The events took an exceptionally favorable turn for them on our left flank, where the Austrians succeeded by September 1st to break through our lines to the railway station Travniki, the seizure of which interrupted the nearest railroad communication between the Fourth and Fifth armies.

To complete the characteristic of the general situation it must be remembered, that at this same period the Russian army had to pass through the tragical issue of our operations in East Prussia, as a result of which the whole front of the Narew had been thrown open to an invasion, from the north, of Russian Poland by the Germans, to whom reinforcements were hurrying up from their western front.

The Russian Supreme Command had therefore to strain all its energies for getting out with honor, out of the critical situation which had arisen out of the events. For this there was but one way, to win a decisive victory over the Austro-Hungarian armies. The initial plan of developing and widening the offensive operation by throwing fresh troops into the balance on the left bank of the Vistula, no more answered the actual situation, the more so, as two army corps (I and XVIII) out of the three, which had been at the direct disposal of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, had already been spent. It had become indispensable to content one's self with the preparation of a decisive stroke on the right bank of that river. In accordance with this decision the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaivitch, stimulated the troops of the southwest front to the utmost exertions and at the same time confirmed a series of measures to the purpose of forming a strong offensive group on the right flank of this front. It was expected, that an energetic offensive of this group, in harmony with the offensive of the Third and Eighth armies, might, in its ultimate results, lead to a catastrophe of the Austro-Hungarian forces. On account of the seriousness of the situation on the front of the Fourth army, the command of the latter was entrusted to General Evert, a firm and calm leader, who, to that, before joining his army, had received personal instructions from

the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Next to that measures were taken for the acceleration of the transport of the III Caucasian and the XVIII corps, which had already been directed to the front of the Fourth army, and of a certain number of divisions of secondary formation to the same destination. Independently of that, the last corps, still remaining at the direct disposal of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief—the Guards—was ordered to the region of active operations of that same army. As by these measures the effective force of the Fourth army had risen to six army corps and some divisions of secondary formation, it was decided, in the interest of facilitating the handling of this huge mass, to divide this army in two: the Fourth and the Eighth (General Letchitzky). Lastly, the Stavka had ordered to form a strong group of cavalry on the left side of the Vistula, in the region of Radom, which, under certain circumstances, might seriously threaten the Austrian line of retreat on Cracow.

The results of these measures did not fail to manifest themselves. The Fourth army, strengthened by the arrival of reinforcements, not only succeeded in holding its own against all further attacks of the Austrians, but by September 2nd had inflicted a crushing defeat on the turning columns of the enemy. Following up this success, the Fourth army had assumed an energetic counter-offensive on the whole front. Immediately after the Fourth army, the neighboring Fifth army also passed to a vigorous offensive. The situation had completely changed. The Austrians, forced to hasten their retreat with every day, began to lose artillery trains; with every day the number of their prisoners increased, they were already counted by the tens of thousands * * * .

As to the Third and Eighth armies, after their victory on the front Busk-Monasterzyska, they continued their advance and again met the Austrians, which this time had taken up a fortified position on the eastern approaches to Lvov (Lemberg), extending it further to the south, along the river Gnila Lipa. For three consecutive days, from the 29th to the 31st of August, the Third Austro-Hungarian army, greatly increased in its effective strength, endeavored to resist the onset of the Russian armies. However, by midday of August 31st, the Austrians were definitely driven from their positions. The roads to Lvov lay open before the Russian armies which, after overcoming a short resistance of the Austrians on the heights in the

nearest vicinity of the town, made their entry about midday of September 3rd.

The menacing position the Third and Eighth Russian armies were beginning to take up with regard to the Austrians, which meanwhile had penetrated deeply into Russian Poland, obliged the enemy at last to turn his attention towards the danger, which threatened him from the east, the more so, as, like we have already seen, the advantage on the front between the Vistula and the Western Bug, had definitely turned on our side. In estimation of the altered situation, the Austro-Hungarian Supreme Command decided on a new groupment of its forces, with the idea of opposing only the lesser part of its forces (five Austrian army corps and one German landwehr company) to the offensive of the Ninth, Fourth and Fifth Russian armies, whereas the main mass (not less than eight army corps, a part of which had been transferred from the Servian front), after having previously drawn up along the river Verechnitza, on the front Rava-ruska-Dniester, was to be thrown against the advancing Third and Eighth Russian armies. In deciding on such an offensive the Austro-Hungarian Supreme Command evidently had in view to throw back beyond Lvov our Third and Eighth armies, and thereby assure a safe retreat of its northern group to the other side of the river San.

Notwithstanding a certain loss of time, due to the preconceived conception of the strength of the fortifications which surrounded Lvov and to the military importance of that place, the Third and Eighth Russian armies succeeded in anticipating the enemy in his deployment on the front Krystynopol-Zolkiew-Mikolajow, from where these armies in their turn assumed an energetic offensive. The corps of the right flank of the Third army (XXI) advanced to Lechtchov where, having come in contact with the Fifth army, which at that time had also resumed its offensive, it inflicted a severe defeat on the right flank of the Austrian group, as it was retiring from the north. The remaining corps of the Third and Eighth armies collided with the Fourth, Third and Second Austro-Hungarian armies, which were advancing against them. The fights which followed and lasted five days were remarkable for their fierceness. Particularly hard was the situation of our Eighth army, which had to bear the brunt of the Austrian attack, in the direction of Lvov and the river Dniester. But the successful turning manœuvre of the corps of the right flank of the Third Russian army and the approaching of the Fifth army, which already was marching up to the front southwards of Tomachev,

thus threatening the lines of retreat of the eastern Austrian group to the river San, irrecoverably decided the battle.

In the night of September 12th, the general retreat of the eastern group of the Austrians towards the crossings of the river San began.

The power of resistance of the Austro-Hungarian armies had been definitively broken on the whole vast front. The enemy weltered unrestrainably towards the west and, after having crossed the river San, he still continued his retreat beyond the river Visloka, as a formless mass, and uncovering all the roads, leading into Hungary and the Bukovina.

The great fatigue and heavy losses of the Russian armies unfortunately put a limit to the pursuit of the defeated enemy. Notwithstanding that, by the middle of September our armies of the southwest front already firmly stood on the river San and further on along the right bank of the river Dniester.

Thus ended the Russian offensive operations in Galicia, where, in comparison with those of East Prussia, the given task was in much better harmony with its solution. In the operations, here described, armies of millions took part from each side, struggling with each other without interruption—in battling or manoeuvring—for over three weeks.

The offensive method of conducting the War by the Russian armies, which characterizes the first period of the great drama on the eastern front, has been of the greatest influence, not only on the strategy of the Germans during these days, but on the whole course of the War in general.

The invasion of East Prussia, effected much sooner than our enemies expected, and with considerable forces into the bargain, created sentiment of uneasiness at the German Headquarters and a sentiment of anxiety for the fate of their eastern provinces, in the whole German nation. The news of this offensive was received at a most decisive moment—just as the Germans were proceeding to the execution of their plan—grand in its conception, of an invasion of the territory of our ally, France, with which they opened the War on their western frontier. This plan required the utmost efforts of all available forces, whereby of course it was quite out of question that not only an army corps, but even a single battalion might be superfluous. Notwithstanding this, the news of our invasion of East Prussia appeared so threatening, that the German Headquarters

decided to throw immediately into this Province two army corps (Reserve Guards and XI) and one division of cavalry, taken to that from their most important offensive flank. A third corps had also been designed to be sent to this front and only later this order was retracted. Besides materially weakening the stroke, which already had been dealt, the news of the unexpected situation on the eastern frontier of the German Empire, must, without doubt, have been of discouraging influence on the psychology of the German leaders, on their faith in their cause and consequently on their decision to win.

These circumstances have, without doubt, contributed in a certain measure to the relief of the tension on the front of our western allies; the genius of their leaders and the gallantry of their troops did the rest. Their victory on the Marne definitely frustrated the hopes of the Germans to end the contest on their western front by a lightning-like stroke.

On the other hand, our victories in Galicia, won over the Austrians by the Russian armies, destroyed also the other illusion of the Germans, the illusion of being able to hold their eastern front with the Austrian army alone, supported by comparatively unimportant German forces. The defeat of the Austro-Hungarian armies and after that the transfer of our operations on the left bank of the Vistula, created a new menacing situation, and to that in a still more dangerous for Germany, direction. These circumstances compelled the German Headquarters already in October and the beginning of November, 1914, notwithstanding the fierce battles raging on the northern sector of their western theatre of war, to reinforce for the second time, and very considerably, their eastern front with troops, mostly brought up from the western front and only partly consisting of new formations.

But even that proved to be insufficient. In order to paralyze Russia, Germany persuaded Turkey to enter the lists against her and thus bring about complications on the Caucasian frontier. And again, apprehensions for her eastern front compelled Germany in the beginning of 1915, to send troops into East Prussia, which in the course of the winter months had been carefully trained in view of an offensive, projected for the coming spring in the west. Lastly, in spring of that same year, when Russia was about to deal Austria-Hungary a decisive, and this time, it may be believed, mortal blow, Germany was again obliged to throw enormous forces on her eastern front and even to transfer to there the central organ for the direction

of her armies, thus weakening her forces on the western theatre of war.

This state of affairs continued till the beginning of autumn, 1915, when new problems turned the attention of the German army to another side.

And so, during the first year of the War, Russia drew on herself gradually more and more German forces, to the detriment of her western front. In bearing during the long months of the year 1915, the brunt of the onset of the alliance against the powers of the Entente, Russia fulfilled an excessively important and responsible task for the common cause of the nations, which stood up against German tyranny. By her manner of acting, which drew the attention of the principal adversary on herself, the allies were allowed a breathing time of nearly a year, after their strenuous efforts during the period of the Marne operations. The Governments of the allied powers were thus enabled to profit largely of these conditions for the development of their armed forces, the amendment of defects, which had become apparent in the matériel and outfit of the armies and also for adapting the national industry to the wants of a further prolonged and stubborn struggle, which in its ultimate results gave the victory to the powers of the Entente.

NOTES ON DUTY AT SEA

BY CAPTAIN LOUIS ESTEL FAGAN, U.S.M.C., U. S. S. ARKANSAS

THese notes are contributed for the information of those Marine officers who have not as yet had sea service. They are based upon the functions of the guard serving with the U. S. S. *Arkansas*, now attached to the Scouting Force, which makes them generally applicable to any battleship of our Navy.

Our complement is one captain, one lieutenant, one first sergeant, one gunnery sergeant, four sergeants, eight corporals, two trumpeters, twelve privates first-class and fifty-seven privates, making a total of seventy-five enlisted men. The Division Flagship is allowed five privates in addition for orderlies to the rear admiral.

The Marines man eight of the sixteen five-inch guns, which fire separate ammunition. Each gun has its individual crew, and one loading crew serves two guns, one port, the other starboard. A Marine is detailed to each gun as a "striker," to assist the gunner's mate in its care. He has no guard duty except in an emergency, and enjoys all night in. He and the non-coms sleep on cots, whilst the other privates swing in hammocks. The plugman of each gun is gun captain, and wears his insignia on the right sleeve of his flannel shirt or coat. He is generally a sergeant or a corporal. The first sergeant and gunnery sergeant are battery commanders, each taking actual charge of four guns, whilst the Marine officers are stationed half-way up the mainmast controlling the fire and spotting the splashes of the projectiles as they strike the water near the target. "Talkers" assist in transmitting the information over telephones and voice tubes to the sight setters at the guns, who repeat all commands in a loud voice to the men at the guns.

In May, 1917, the Bureau of Ordnance arranged with the Admiralty for the adoption of the British firing system in the United States Navy. This was highly confidential and had not been divulged to any other power. In August, 1917, plans were made to install the complete director firing system on one vessel of the *Nevada* class. All drawings were sent to America and the New York Navy Yard was authorized to make gun directors and towers. Receivers, repeat indicators, motors and transmitters were manufactured elsewhere.

One of the leading experts from Vickers, Ltd., came to this country to assist the Bureau. In April, 1918, the plants and machinery were ready and by July, 1918, the first complete installation was finished on board the *Arkansas*, followed soon after by the *New Mexico*, *Mississippi* and *Utah*, and on all first-line vessels by January, 1919.

With the Vickers type of follow-the-pointer system, all guns are trained, pointed and fired from a single master gun-director mounted on the upper deck of the battleship, in a position affording a much better view of the enemy than is ordinarily possible from the gun sights. Broadside director towers on battleships are located where the view is as free as possible from the gases of broadside guns, and is unobstructed by spray and water from the splashes of enemy short shots or the rough seaway. The towers have a large arc of train and, as far as possible, are clear of the blast sector of turrets. Although the system permits of firing all the broadside mounts simultaneously from the director tower, it should be clearly understood that the Vickers method of director firing involves no alteration in the standard method of fire control of broadside guns, but simply provides a primary means of automatic control, which can be used effectively until the ship is seriously damaged by shell fire. All gun-director gear is additional to, and independent of, equipment for individual firing.

This system has withstood the test of actual battle. The parts are rugged, heavy, and so designed as to be waterproof; the towers afford protection to its crew from the weather, blast of guns, flying splinters and other disturbing influences that normally affect the accuracy of control. Errors of sight-setting are reduced, a greater rapidity and volume of fire is obtained and all guns can be quickly and accurately trained on a designated bearing and held there throughout the firing.

Two towers are located on each side of the *Arkansas*, one forward on the bridge, one aft on the main deck. Each normally controls and fires the four guns of its group, but switches in the plotting room below decks may be thrown to put all eight of the guns on one side under the control of either tower. In each tower is a sight-setter, a pointer and a trainer.

During general quarters, when all hands are at their battle stations, Marines permanently detailed relieve the Captain's orderly, brig post, life-buoy post, communication orderly, time orderly and

corporal of the guard. One man remains in the Marine compartment, situated on the berth deck, to man the fire-hose and to safeguard property of the men.

Guard duty on ship board is very tiring when done correctly. About seven men are detailed for each post and three of them stand watch each day. Thus, the guard of the day is composed of one sergeant, three corporals and fifteen privates. The trumpeters are merged with the sailor buglers and rotate on tours of duty. One non-com is detailed in the compartment as "police and mess sergeant," and has a day's work cut out for him during every twenty-four hours of his tour of duty. One or two privates are detailed to the crew's galley, where they learn the art of cooking, which proves of value when the guard goes into camp ashore. Three messmen are also kept busy getting "seconds on chow." The old battle-cry "When do we eat?" still resounds in the ranks. A detachment clerk and a non-com acting as supply sergeant make correspondence and quartermaster returns as easy and accurate as possible. The first sergeant presides over all things, and the gunnery sergeant keeps an eye on ordinance gear and supervises the work of the broadsides groups. These two mess with the chief petty officers and at quarters are armed with swords.

There are two storerooms assigned to us—in one is kept clothing, in the other everything else from infantry range-finders to tentage. We have Browning automatic rifles, pistols, intrenching tools, acetylene lamps, buzzycots, field telephones, etc., ready to land on a sand spit or in a civilized village, and to make ourselves comfortable, just as sea-going leathernecks have been doing since Esek Hopkins took them down to the West Indies for the first time in the old days.

The appearance of the guard is of great importance. The visiting admiral sees comparatively few things when he comes over the side, and those few things *must be good*. He is piped over by a boatswain's mate and saluted by side-boys. The full guard presents arms. The trumpeter blows the flourishes. The drums sound the ruffles. The band plays bars from the "Admiral's March." The captain and the Officer of the Deck salute. The visiting admiral disappears into the cabin, followed by the captain of the ship. Finis!

It may be contended by some people that details of dress are of no importance. This may be true in a mining camp or a steel mill, but it does not apply to Marines. A body of slovenly Marines on parade is a sad spectacle, and should not exist. The fault can be

traced to the Marine officer commanding. If he appears on deck with unpressed trousers, soiled white gloves, unpolished sword, dull buttons, crushed cap with thumb-marked visor, and a pace like a cripple, it is a cinch that his guard will reflect his own glory. That is unless by the grace of God, the first sergeant refuses to follow suit. It is absurd for any officer to demand perfection in appearance of his men when he makes no effort to clean himself up. The fact that he takes a bath and shaves is no indication that he does credit to his uniform.

We are paid primarily for two things: to supply ourselves with board and lodging, and to clothe ourselves. It is not contemplated that officers will appear in old caps, thread-bare coats and trousers, frayed cuffs and shoes that are down at the heel. Furthermore, a slovenly officer, being content with his own appearance, will generally be content with the slovenly appearance of his men, for he does not know what details to correct in them. It takes a lot more nerve to admonish a private for dull buttons when our own buttons are covered with verdigris. For the men in the ranks can not be snappy if the officers roam around in front of them, dress company without precision, and handle their swords as though they had never unsheathed them before.

Some will complain that keeping blues in good shape requires too much time. The following points may be of interest in this connection: 1. Have two suits; one for the tailor shop, one for wear. Brush clothes when taken off and when put on, placing them on coat hangers in a locker, free from the salt air that tarnishes brass and dampens clothing. 2. Brush shoes when taken off and put on, and keep on trees when not in use. Have them whole-soled and heeled before they hit bottom. 3. When not actually in use, keep caps in covered boxes. 4. Shine buttons and insignia with jewelers' rouge rubbed on a nail-brush, using a board for buttons. Wash the nail-brush from time to time in soap and water. A touch of oil of sassafras on the rouge will remove verdigris quickly. 5. Polish the sword, belt-brass, and brass on slings with canton flannel on which the stick of rouge has been rubbed. 6. Polish belt and other tan leather with Lutetian Cream, applying it with a small dauber brush. This keeps the hands clean. 7. Use old clothes or overalls when dirty work is necessary. 8. Give the barber a chance to make a living, and shave every morning before breakfast. 9. Keep the white cap perfectly blanched, and proceed with white shoes as follows: In top of can, mix blanco with water to the consistency of milk. Hold

shoe upside down. Apply blanco with a small varnish brush. The drip cannot then touch the soles. Polish the edges of leather soles with Whitemore's Boston Waterproof Polish, using the sponge provided. 10. Turn out early enough in the morning to dress properly and carefully for the day. When you step out on the quarterdeck, you will not feel apologetic for your appearance, but will set the proper example to your men. 11. When khaki is the uniform of the day, always shift into whites before supper. Train your mess boy to give you a hand, but see that he does so properly. 12. Ribbons are not worn on a line with the second button of the coat. Their top edge is midway between the first and second button, and parallel with the ground. On the evening dress jacket, the holding bar containing the miniatures should be placed in the same relative position as that on the coat. Marksmanship medals are not worn on a line with the ribbons. They are centred beneath the ribbons, one-quarter of an inch of cloth showing between their top and the bottom of the ribbons. The crown of the anchor of the collar ornament is no longer one and one-half inches from the front edge of the collar, it is the centre line of the ornament that is used in this measurement.

Too many of us regard the Uniform Regulations as a sort of encyclopedia to be used for reference only. As a matter of fact, it should be studied carefully from cover to cover, in order to insure uniformity amongst the commissioned personnel. Were this the case, striped cuffs with pearl cuff buttons would not be viewed as sartorial accessories to the uniform of some of the future generals, nor would collars and cuffs be worn with whites, etc.

The ordinary fair weather routine aboard the *Arkansas* for weekdays at sea is as follows: Reveille at 5.00 A.M. At 5.30 the guard forms on deck, clad in any uniform, and with the officers, goes through fifteen minutes physical drill, led by an officer or a sergeant. In this connection, it may be pointed out that officers and first sergeants need quite as much exercise as buck privates, perhaps more. After this, everyone is thoroughly awake and can go to his cleaning station more alive than dead. Breakfast follows at about 7.15 A.M. At 8.45 A.M. guard mount is held, varying in form according to the amount of room available. The band, part of the Ninth Division (Marines), parades at this time. At 9.15 A.M. daily quarters is held, and the division is reported formally, all division officers falling in to report to the Gunnery Officer, who then falls in with the other department heads. The Executive Officer receives their reports and

transmits them to the captain. Meanwhile the divisions are going through physical drill to band music, from which the Marines are excused. It is impossible to exercise properly when you are all dressed up in a coat and belt, hence the early morning drill where any uniform goes, and when the sun is still low. At about 9.30 A.M. General Quarters sounds on trumpet and gong, and eleven hundred men all run in different directions, like ants on a disturbed hill. Guns are cast loose and provided, and firing at a supposed enemy is simulated. Following this at 11 A.M., comes loading drill on specially designed machines, spotting drill for officers, dotter drill for gun-pointer groups, etc. Chow, that blessed product that has been steaming all morning, is served in the various compartments on tables, with folding legs, that are removed from nests on the overhang, and everyone is happy as long as the "seconds" hold out. This important event takes place at noon. At 1 P.M. begin other means of keeping young minds busily occupied until about 3.30 P.M., when everybody but a favored few, knocks off and calls it a day. Movies and a band concert fill in the spare hours before taps.

Capitol ships have ample provisions for officers' quarters. Ours are located forward. If the Marine officer be a captain or a first lieutenant, he eats in the Wardroom. Second lieutenants live in the Steerage with the ensigns, where the happiest days of an officer's career are spent, provided the messmates be congenial. At the head of the Wardroom table sits the Executive Officer, who generally has the rank of commander. On his right sits the next in rank, on his left the next in rank, and so on, zigzagging down to the foot of the table, where sits the Mess Treasurer, one of the officers elected by his shipmates to supervise the stewards and the finances. Each one so elected holds the position for at least two months.

The staterooms are fully equipped with steel furniture, consisting of a bunk, a desk, a clothes locker and a chiffonier, all provided with deep drawers. There is room for two steamer trunks in each stateroom, and a trunk storeroom holds all other baggage. Each mess attendant (Filipino or Africano) looks after two officers and keeps their rooms clean. He will do much or nothing at all, depending upon how you train him. Towards these men, as towards everyone else in the world, firmness and kindness must be mixed judiciously in order to produce results. They are anxious to serve a considerate officer, and are on the whole very honest. One should never give any tips to them, as this practice destroys discipline.

The wardroom is usually equipped with a piano and a phonograph, and the mess subscribes to the leading newspapers and magazines. The monthly bill averages thirty dollars payable in advance, and officers sign chits for articles purchased from the cigar mess, payable at the end of the month. Laundry service is inexpensive as to charges, but the havoc wrought upon the linen is quite often very costly in the long run. It is best to have one's boy wash out silk socks and white gloves.

The winter uniform for men in port is blues with white belts and gloves. At sea fair leather belts without gloves are worn. In the summer, when whites are being worn by the sailors, the Marine wears khaki and fair leather belts, garrison cap and slacks. Leggings are not worn aboard ship, except for landing force drill, when web belts are prescribed. Mess jackets, now known as "evening dress jackets," are not worn at mess aboard ship except for special occasions. They are often prescribed for social functions ashore, however, and must be a part of an officer's kit. The full-dress uniform is not as yet authorized by uniform regulations. Six suits of whites and four of khaki are enough, if taken care of. Those officers who rate medals should have them and their miniatures placed on holding bars, ribbons of uniform length, and properly lapped if their number requires this arrangement. When the full guard and band are called away, "dress uniform" may be prescribed for Marines. This occasionally happens at Saturday morning inspection. White dress uniform is often prescribed in the tropics, and with it are worn miniatures of decorations, medals and the expeditionary ribbon. In passing it might be observed that the expeditionary ribbon, worn with decorations and medals is a sorry looking ornament. It is advisable to have a number of bars made at a time so that service ribbons will always be clean and in good condition. This point is frequently overlooked. It is almost needless to state that the custom of plastering the chest with medals in crooked rows is inexcusable.

General Washington, in a letter to his stepson at Princeton College, advises him to make intimate friends very slowly, and with great care. He also states that it is more difficult to retain friends than to make enemies. This good advice applies to the newly arrived officer aboard ship. Very often the brother officer to whom you take a great liking at first, will prove inferior in quality to him whom you regard as less worthy of your admiration. Make it a general rule to refrain from telling the mess how wonderful the Marine

Corps is, etc., etc. They will find this out if your guard delivers the goods consistently. Do not carry a chip on your shoulder, fighting gallantly the battles of the Corps in the wardroom or the steerage. If people find that they can yet your goat by a few well-chosen remarks you will never have any peace. Go right to the bat if injustice be shown to you or to your guard, and have things clearly understood without any delay, but there will be little injustice to complain about if you keep on the job. Now, being on the job does not consist in running around the ship like a decapitated chicken, attempting to do the work of two officers and fourteen non-coms. It consists in making the work of the junior officer interesting and varied, and in outlining clearly the duties of each sergeant and corporal, and seeing that this work is done correctly and without unnecessary talk. Disobedience to a corporal should be punished immediately. He cannot help you if you fail to back him up. As for the lieutenant, the War in France showed the blindest company commander his real importance and the absurdity of attempting to subordinate him to the first sergeant.

It is this Marine Corps system of organization that makes it possible for the detachment commander to have more time to himself than the average division officer aboard ship. It leaves him free to learn other things, to devote some of his time to study and good reading, and to develop himself mentally and physically. And from time to time the ship moves on to another port, where he sees what's on the other side of the hill and makes new friends without having to break camp or pack any trunks. *C'est la vie!*

ADDRESS TO THE GRADUATING CLASS OF
MARINE OFFICERS AT QUANTICO
ON JUNE 9, 1923

BY REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM L. RODGERS, U.S.N.

THE Marine Corps, through the efforts of your seniors and predecessors in the corps of officers, holds a very high place in the regard and esteem of the country. The maintenance of that high position depends on your efforts and those whom you train to be your successors. You have spent a year here as students in various classes and in various studies; you have increased your knowledge of the technique of your profession. You have attended a school of technical knowledge, but there is another phase of the school which is no less important, that is as a school of character. The Marine Corps, and the service it, through you, is able to render to the country, will owe much to your development of professional knowledge here, but it will owe more to your character as started in your home life, developed here and elsewhere as long as you live. In this school, every man remains an undergraduate all his life.

When the Major General Commandant asked me to come here and make a few remarks, I estimated the situation after the fashion in which you have been trained, and decided that in dealing with it I would follow the well-known and very successful method of the church in putting forth its views. The church takes a text and preaches a sermon. I hope, however, that this sermon may be of more effect as well as of more interest to you than many which I have been obliged to listen to on Sundays.

The text I find in the first of the articles for the Government of the Navy, which reads in part as follows:

"The commanders of all fleets, squadrons, naval stations, and vessels belonging to the Navy are required to show in themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination; to be vigilant in inspecting the conduct of all persons who are placed under their command; to guard against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices, and to correct, according to the laws and regulations of the Navy, all persons who are guilty of them."

This text may be summarized still further by saying that officers are expected to be gentlemen as suggested by the traditional phrase

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of the military services, "officers and gentlemen." The word gentleman is too frequently understood to refer to prominence in what is termed "good society." In this country it really refers to high character. If one has the character of a gentleman, he is in great part fitted to be an officer. Many of the elements making up the character of a gentleman are named in the article for the Government of the Navy, which I have just read. Synonyms for these terms may be found in the words loyalty, justice, sympathy, judgment, and above all, courage. It takes much courage to behave as a gentleman at all times.

In every profession, both civil and military, the personnel falls into two classes. There is the operative or working class, which forms the majority of the profession, and the managing or directive class, whose members in civil life are known as managers, and in military life are known as officers. No man can be a complete success either as a manager in civil life or as officer in military life, unless he is also a gentleman. An officer has two spheres in which to work: one is to make his command efficient; the other is to make himself efficient in using the command which he has previously trained. In order to train subordinates the development of character which one should specially seek is on the side of justice, loyalty and sympathy. When men perceive that their commander has these qualities, he owns his command and can do what he will with it. To make himself proficient in employing his command aright and to use it effectively in peace and war, an officer needs especially, loyalty and courage. I would like, under each case of these headings to say a few words to stimulate you never to relax your study and conscious efforts to improve your inborn qualities in these directions.

There are several different kinds of loyalty, which sometimes support one another and sometimes seem to oppose each other. There is loyalty of the family, and the loyalty to one's own social class into which one is thrown by the necessity of life and similarity of tastes and close association; and there is professional loyalty. In professional loyalty, we have again three subdivisions: Loyalty to superiors, loyalty to colleagues and loyalty to subordinates. Of all these different classes and sub-classes, the loyalty to professional subordinates is the one which we are most liable to forget and the loyalty to superiors is the one which I think we are most liable knowingly to transgress.

The others, perhaps, are usually easier to maintain. Among all

these varying forms of loyalty, you must train yourselves by never-ending reflection and study always to be ready with a decision as to which is the commanding one for the moment, and how the others are to be maintained without sacrifice of harmony. Decisions involving matters of loyalty are often among the most trying arising in life. All good loyalties are harmonious, not conflicting.

Turning again to our text that officers should show themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism and subordination, I quote from another officer of the Navy that:

"Patriotism is loyalty to the country.

"Subordination is loyalty to authority, to the commander and to his plan. Insubordination is disloyalty.

"Virtue, which here means valor or courage, implies a willingness to fight for one's beliefs and principles. Timidity or cowardice implies a willingness to abandon them, a disloyalty to them.

"Honor is a nice sense of what is just, right and true.

"Honor is really loyalty to self.

"Thus we see that the first two principles, virtue and honor, are founded on loyalty, and the latter two, patriotism and subordination, are really forms of loyalty itself."

So that our navy Bible from which we have taken our text may be said to be founded on these three—virtue, honor and loyalty.

And quoting further:

"What are some of the enemies of loyalty?

"They are well known and should be guarded against constantly; idle gossip, loose criticism, a willingness to believe the worst; snap judgment without waiting for facts—these are disloyalty to the cause, whether it be embodied in a personality or an ideal."

With reference to subordinates, the attributes of loyalty which must always accompany it are justice and sympathy. The older officers present all know that younger people too frequently forget, that through lack of sympathy with their subordinates, young officers in learning to deal with the men under their command often gain experience at the expense of their subordinates. When an officer makes an error in judgment in handling an administrative matter, in too many cases his fault leads some subordinate to infringe discipline. So the subordinate in his punishment pays the expense of training the thoughtless officer in the proper mode of carrying on his duties.

As an example, I recollect some years ago on a ship under my command, a young officer of the deck had orders to send a boat ashore and be back before dinner hour. He forgot to send the boat

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until after the ship's company had sat down to dinner. He called away his boat and the crew were naturally slow. He went personally to call the men from their dinner. Even a dog growls when you take a bone from him, and one of the men was disrespectful and insubordinate to such a degree that it was necessary to punish him. In this case the officer received a lesson, but his subordinate paid the price of the officer's education.

But sympathy must not displace justice and disciplinary and administrative severity when needed. It is easy to be sympathetic. It is hard to be just to all, to consider the rights of those who are not present in face of the demands of those before one's eyes. The Navy, of which you are a part, is a public instrument. The public demands efficiency. Discipline must be preserved even if punitive measures are necessary. The reform of the individual is a secondary affair, no doubt very desirable in itself, but to be attempted only when compatible with general efficiency. Along these lines you will find opportunity for life-long progress if you choose to exert yourself and you will find abundant return in the respect and esteem of your associates. There are people who are natural leaders, who have the gifts of leadership and who develop them by experience, and yet they are not wholly successful as they rise in rank and are granted independent authority. As one rises higher and higher in rank the demands on one's technical knowledge are less accentuated, less insistent and less absorbing. I do not mean to say that a commanding officer of high rank can dispense with technical knowledge, for he cannot do so, but he needs to pay more and more attention to his loyalty to his superiors and to his administrative courage. A chief task is to inculcate high professional standards among his subordinates according to his best tact and discretion.

In this country with democratic ideals, loyalty to superiors is not so much a personal loyalty as it is loyalty to superior office and loyalty to the plan of operations which the senior is entitled to require by virtue of his temporary occupation of office. It is this that distinguishes monarchical government from democratic government. In the monarchical form of government, loyalty is to the person who has the right to hold office rather than to office itself.

To come back to the definition of a gentleman, honor, mentioned in the article of the Government of the Navy, is largely a matter of loyalty. It is incompatible with self-seeking and the desire to get one's self in the limelight for selfish purposes. Subordination to the

plan is one of the great elements of professional success in war, and it is one too often violated. Military history is full of cases where violation of loyalty has led to national defeat. I do not mean by this traitorous or treasonable disloyalty but merely insubordination and failure to see one's self in proper relation to the whole, in short, the desire to get notoriety and take to one's self all the credit for successful action. But the great factor in all leadership is courage; and in using the word courage, I do not mean the ordinary use of the word in which we associate courage with meeting physical danger well. We all of us have sufficient physical courage for the ordinary purposes of life and in the few cases where people are somewhat deficient in it themselves, they are often able to draw it in sufficient quantity from their neighbors and associates. The officer's courage consists in the strength to make a right decision and to adhere to it whatever comes. Many may have enough of this kind of courage to exercise efficiently a small command with small responsibilities but few are equal to great commands with large responsibilities. Those who have courage to meet the greatest responsibilities are those whose names the world remembers.

But this courage must be tempered with judgment and discretion and intelligence. There is a story frequently told to children of some magician's castle where the hero attempting to penetrate within is met by the triple advice over the gateway: "Be bold—be bold, be not too bold." Here we have the ideal message to the officer, twice to take courage to make the bold decision and the third to observe good judgment not to allow courage to develop into bravado; to measure wisely what is reasonable to undertake.

Above all things officers should guard their reputations. For better or for worse, reputations are built up in the course of years by consistent conduct. Officers should be high-minded and see that their actions permit of no base or unworthy interpretation. Nothing is more necessary in development of character. At the present time in peace we rely very much on competition as a means to promoting technical efficiency. It is a very great element in the training and development of the Navy, but it has its fault, and that is that in our effort to win in the competitive game, we do not preserve our high-mindedness and our reputations for such high-mindedness. We are too apt to be out to win, cost what it may. The fault is not that competition corrupts character, but it reveals it. If there is anything

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weak in a man's character, competition searches it out. Recollect always in the stress of competition the Bible maxim that "he who *seeks to save his soul shall lose it.*" If your anxiety to win leads to the smallest disregard of honor you deserve to lose. We are not often able to prove judicially and juridically infringements of the true sporting spirit in competition, but reputation knows you, and itself is known to the law of the land. The service knows who are really meritorious and who are not, and never fails to distinguish.

In approaching conclusion, let me repeat the text which I started with:

Show in yourselves a "good example of virtue, honor, patriotism and subordination" and in so doing and only by so doing, will you be able to render effective all the technique of knowledge with which you have equipped yourselves in the past year at Quantico. For this and to pass to your successors a worthy example more than all else one needs courage and devotion.

One word more: Today—this very morning, the midshipman training squadron are performing the last funeral service for Admiral H. S. Knapp. Nowhere in our service can be found a better example of character development than in him. He was a man in which great professional ability and acquirements were joined to great force of character. He was entrusted with the highest duties of his profession. He met all of them adequately, but he will be remembered in the Navy because he always had the courage to show lofty character and high-mindedness. He never failed. He was a model of a gentleman in the best sense of the word. His professional attainments were multiplied by his devotion to all that was uplifting.

AMERICAN MARINES AT THE GOLDEN HORN

A SKETCH OF LIFE WITH THE MARINE GUARD ON THE U. S. S.
PITTSBURGH, ON EUROPEAN STATION AT CONSTANTINOPLE, WITH
IMPRESSIONS ON THE NEAR-EASTERN SITUATION

BY CAPTAIN R. L. MONTAGUE, U.S.M.C.

THE man who wrote "Join the Marines and see the world," must have had sea duty on the U. S. S. *Pittsburgh* in mind when he coined the phrase. A good deal of the time, the *Pittsburgh* lies at Constantinople, and there is no better place to see the world than that, anywhere on all the earth or the seven seas. Then, for variety, every so often, we up anchor and go on a cruise. The last one started about the middle of March and took up about a month, taking us to Alexandria, Egypt, and return *via* the Holy Lands, Syria and Asia Minor.

During the trip, we had a chance to visit Cairo, the Sphinx and the Pyramids, Haifa, Beirut, Jerusalem, the Sea of Galilee, and all of the cities and villages of the Holy Land, familiar to Christians all over the world. From Beirut, a trip to Damascus was arranged, about three hundred miles by automobile, and later on the return journey we visited the Island of Rhodes and the Dardanelles battlefield at Gallipoli.

As a combination of travel, education and sea-duty, life aboard the *Pittsburgh* simply can't be beaten, yet I think we were all glad to get back to Constantinople. There is something doing in this town every minute. Nearly every nation has its press bureau here and each and every one of them is issuing statements by the ream, quite a few of them contradictory in character. To the superficial observer the situation seems tense. Perhaps it really is tense, but one living here gets the impression that it isn't likely that anything very sensational will really happen, although the Turks are inclined to bluster and threaten and other nations do their share as well.

There is a good deal of speculation as to whether the Turks will sign the treaty, and what will happen if they don't. But I believe the general opinion is that when they have extracted the last possible concession from the allied powers, they will put their names on the dotted line, and that will be all there is to that. However, the Allies

are inclined to consider the moving of the Turkish capital to Angora, as the greatest of the Turkish atrocities. Angora, I am told, is only a mud village of a few thousand population, and naturally the diplomats hate to think of leaving their comfortable embassies here and moving into field quarters in such a place.

We all looked for some sort of a demonstration in Constantinople when we received the word sometime back that the Turks would not sign the treaty but that evening was just about as quiet as the average, everybody seemed to take the result of the conference as a matter of course, and only the newspaper men and allied officers made any mention of what the probable outcome would be.

The British have about 12,000 men in their Army of Occupation, which is commanded by General Harrington; a brigade is in Constantinople (two or three battalions of Marines making up part of this brigade) and the rest of their land forces are scattered from here to Chanak on the Dardanelles. They also have quite a naval force in these waters commanded by Admiral De Brock, two or three battleships of the dreadnaught type and several armored cruisers, in addition to several destroyer-leaders, destroyers, supply ships, an airplane carrier, submarines and one hospital ship, and I understand that the British ships occupy many of the strategic points along the Dardanelles and Bosphorus. There are also about 100 British aeroplanes in this vicinity, so I do not think there is any question of who would hold the supremacy of the air should hostilities be resumed.

The British have plans for immediate evacuation of Constantinople in case of necessity, removing all troops and civilian officials by boat to Chanak or further. The plans call for a twelve hours' evacuation and they easily have enough ships in the harbor at all times to accommodate all of their people here. Although this plan has never been published and there is no evidence of its having been practiced, it is rumored that every man and woman knows exactly what to do if the word to move is passed. All British officers carry sidearms at all times.

The French Army of Occupation, which is commanded by General Charpé, is for the most part in Stamboul (Constantinople), although they have a few battalions in the interior towards Adrianople and some few troops on the Dardanelles. An estimate of all the troops the French have in this part of the country is between 4000 and 5000 men and officers. The French naval forces in the Bosphorus, consist

of several large cruisers and a few destroyers, under the command of Rear Admiral Vindry, and I hear that there are a few French warships in the Dardanelles.

The Italian forces in Turkey consist of about 450 effectives, all of which are in Constantinople, and they have two cruisers and four destroyers in the harbor. General Monbelli is in command of the army and is acting High Commissioner.

The newest warship in the harbor is the Spanish ship *Jaime I*, which was completed a little over a year ago, and is the only ship of any type flying the Spanish flag in the Bosphorus at the present time.

The Bosphorus is quite a picture with the great allied fleets and about twenty American destroyers, and in addition commercial vessels of practically every nationality in the world, and occasionally a great transatlantic liner with tourists laying out at the entrance of the Sea of Marmara.

The entire Turkish Navy (with the exception of one of the ships she got from Germany, which is now interned in the Dardanelles) is at the Turkish Navy Yard, which is up the Golden Horn just beyond the Galata Bridge, and although I have not been aboard any of the vessels, they all appear to be in dire need of repairs and are of the most obsolete types.

The Russian refugees are much in evidence, the remnants of General Wrangel's army; about 250 men are quartered in Salimik Barracks over in Scutari, where they are subsisted by charity. The camp is as clean as a pin, in spite of the wretched appearance of its inmates, and all are working who can find anything to do. There are an additional 22,000 Russian refugees registered in Constantinople, many of whom are women; a good number of these are in private homes doing domestic work and quite a few are employed in theatres and cabarets. Practically all of the restaurants in Pera and all of the cabarets are run by Russians; they have Russian entertainers and waiters and waitresses.

There is also an Armenian Refugee Camp here, where nearly 50,000 refugees are herded together and subsisted by the American Relief Administration. I have never seen this camp, but am told that it is filthy and the suffering is terrible. There are quite a few Armenians in business here.

There are a few Greeks in town and many of these wear the red fez, so it is hard to tell which are Greeks. One of the largest

and finest hotels here is run by a Greek, and you see quite a few of their business signs up in town. So far I have not seen a Greek soldier since I crossed the frontier, but I am told that there are about 100,000 men mobilized on the Maritza River in case hostilities are renewed.

There are many more allied troops in Constantinople than there are Turkish troops, but the Turks I have seen are well dressed, fine-looking soldiers, and I understand that since their victories of last year that the morale has been excellent. I saw quite a few Turkish soldiers between Adrianople and here when I came through on the train and they were about the same in appearance as those I have seen here on the streets. From the train their equipment seemed to be modern and in very good shape, and also the earth fortifications, trenches and wire for the defense of Constantinople very well kept up.

AFTER THREE HUNDRED AND FIFTY YEARS

BEING THE STORY OF "CHARLES' FORT," BUILT BY JEAN RIBAULT IN
1562 ON WHAT IS NOW KNOWN AS PARRIS ISLAND,
SOUTH CAROLINA

BY MAJOR GEORGE H. OSTERHOUT, JR., U.S.M.C.

AS time passes, we look back with ever-increasing interest on the life and adventures of the earliest explorers and settlers on this continent; and particularly so upon those of the courageous men who came in the first century after Columbus. Any traces of their forts and dwelling places, or any relics rendered precious by their use, have for the most of us a fascination powerful enough to even divert our attention from present modern wonders such as the Airplane, the Radio,—and, yes, also, even from the "Movies."

However, few traces are now left of those first hardy adventurers, largely due to the very nature of the way they had to settle, as well as the materials they were usually obliged to employ in their constructions. For their ships were few and small, so that cargo space was indeed at a premium. Consequently, they had to depend largely upon what they themselves were able to fashion out of the wilderness surrounding them. And the wooden stockades and breastworks of dirt they reared did not, as a rule, survive much beyond the days of the builders themselves, let alone lasting to the present time.

Now, many of us regard the period of the American Revolution as of the dim past, yet it is only one hundred and forty-six years back to the days of 1776, while it is necessary to go over two hundred years further in the past beyond that era to reach to the time of Ayllón, Cartier, Coligny, and Ribault. For more than three hundred and fifty years have passed (360, to be exact) since those able men attempted to plant the first European footholds on this hemisphere.

Naturally, after this long lapse of time, little could be expected to be found of those first structures placed in the virgin wilderness. And that is what was felt in regards to exploring the site of "Charles' Fort," constructed by the French Huguenots sent out from France by Coligny under the leadership of Jean Ribault. But, in this

instance, by reason of a number of fortuitous circumstances, the success achieved has been such, as it would seem, to merit general interest.

But before describing the results of these recent excavations, it is well to give a brief summary of the incidents surrounding the building of "Charles' Fort," and the deeds and adventures of those concerned in the same. And those who have not the time, or, inclination, to refer to the excellent sources of information noted in subsequent paragraphs, may profit by these abstracts.

THE FIRST TO ATTEMPT A FOOTHOLD

In speaking of the first places established by Europeans on these shores, the use of the term "settlement" is rather a misnomer. For, following Columbus, there first came an eager succession of explorers and others, intent on establishing valid claims, or seizing by force, as much as possible of this newly discovered continent for their own rulers and countries. And, as they were firm believers in those days in the old adage that, "Possession is nine points in law," their first efforts were given largely to erecting and garrisoning some sort of a fortification in the region they desired to annex. They erected these fortifications more as a means of defense from European rivals, than as a protection from the Indians. For, strange to say, the Indians were, at the outset, very hospitable and friendly disposed towards those first to arrive.

Laudonnière, and other trustworthy contemporaries of his time, claim that "Charles' Fort" was the first on this continent over which was flown the royal standard of France. But, excluding from consideration those who were merely explorers, such as Ponce de Léon, Verrazano, Narváez, de Soto, and others, there are only three claims to some sort of a settlement prior to that of Ribault at "Charles' Fort," and some of these are disputed by competent authorities. These were: that by the Spanish on the Isthmus of Darien in 1510; one attempted by Vasquez de Ayllón, also Spanish, in 1526, probably near what is now Cape Fear River; and one that Jacques Cartier attempted in the vicinity of the St. Lawrence River, between 1534 and 1541.

"Charles' Fort" was built by Jean Ribault and his companions in 1562 on a part of what they, themselves, called "Port Royall Island," but which is now known as Parris Island, South Carolina.

It is at present owned by the United States, and is used entirely by the U. S. Marine Corps for the purpose of training recruits.

OBJECT OF RIBAULT'S HAZARDOUS VOYAGE

The force that built "Charles' Fort" sailed from le Havre, France, February 18, 1562, under the active leadership of Jean Ribault; but the great admiral of France under King Charles IX, Gaspard de Coligny, "Admirall of Chastillon" (although he did not go along) was the actual head of the expedition. But several noblemen were in the company, and among them, fortunately, was Rene Goulaine de Laudonnière: fortunately, because it is to the excellent accounts left by him that we are indebted largely for the detailed knowledge we now have of all that occurred on that memorable voyage. Both his statements, and the speeches he attributes to Ribault, clearly establishes that the real object of this hazardous voyage of exploration (for it was indeed hazardous to sail vast stretches of uncharted seas in the vessels then in use) was to enable France to grasp a large portion of this continent.

NARRATIVES LEFT OF THE VOYAGE

It is known that Ribault also wrote a record of this voyage, besides submitting a written report to Coligny. But all of his original manuscripts have been lost; and the information that traces back to him is meagre in details. However, it is conceded he was a man of action rather than a writer, and anything he may have written would have been naturally overshadowed by that of this more learned and noble contemporary, Laudonnière.

Laudonnière's account of the trip was published in 1586—while he was still alive—under the title, "L'Histoire notable de la Floride sitvee es Indes Occidentales, contenent les trois voyages faits en icelle—" (Paris, G. Auuray, 1586). This is the chief source of information for subsequent writers on the subject.

Three years later (1589) the great English geographer and historian of American discovery, Richard Hakluyt, translated Laudonnière's narrative and incorporated it in his famous work, "Divers voyages touching the discovery of America and the islands adjacent —," under the title of ("vol. 7," as reprinted in London for the Hakluyt Society): "The true and last discoverie of Florida, made by Captain John Ribault in the yeere 1562—tr. into Englishe by one Thomas Hackit." Here one may read, in the quaint English of

that period, a detailed account of the explorations and adventures of this voyage; also, a description of the Port Royal region and the site selected for the fort, as viewed in those days; and, besides, the story of the actual building of the fort, as well as the record of what happened to those who were left there to occupy the fort.

EXCELLENT ACCOUNTS AVAILABLE

An admirable summary of the interesting history of "Charles' Fort" is given in the unusually excellent pamphlet prepared by Alexander Sally, entitled, "Parris Island, the Site of the First Attempt at a Settlement of White People Within the Bounds of What is Now South Carolina" (Bulletins of the Historical Commission of South Carolina, No. 5, published, 1919).

A fuller description with more elaboration, is given by Professor Yates Snowden in his splendid, "History of South Carolina," published in 1920.

THE FACTS PROVEN

It is clearly established that Ribault explored the region where he built "Charles' Fort," in May, 1562 "which"—in the words of Laudonnière—"because of the fairnesse and largeness thereof, wee named Port Royall." A name, by the way, which it has retained to the present time.

A STONE PILLAR IS ERECTED

And, as was customary with Ribault, he caused a "pillar of hard stone, fashioned like a columne, wherein the armes of the king of France were graven" to be "planted . . . upon a hillock open round about to the view, and invironed with a lake halfe a fathom deepe of very good and sweete water."

Moreover, he decided to build a fort and to leave in it a volunteer garrison "to make trial, in this our first discovery, of the benefits and commodities of this new land." And, if indeed this was the *prime object* of establishing the fort, it cannot be said that the project was a failure; for it did afford the desired trial, and the experiences gained must have been an aid in subsequent undertakings.

A FORT IS BUILT

They selected a site on the southeastern side of what is now Parris Island on "a small river . . . deep enough to harbour therein Gallies and Galliots (small sail and rowboats) in good numbers; . . . at a very open place lying upon the brinke thereof

. . . fit to build a Fortresse in, and commodious for them that were willing to plant there." Particular mention is also made of a great abundance of deer and other wild game, fish, and delicious berries and fruits.

The fort was originally built 96 feet by 78 feet, and provided with a stockade of cedar (. . . "for it" [i.e., the surrounding country] "was all covered with mighty oaks and infinite stores of cedars, and with Lentiskes" [the mastic tree (*Pistacia lentiscus*)] "growing beneath them, smelling so sweetly, that the very fragrant odor only made the place seem exceedingly pleasant.") Around the outside was a moat (fosse, or ditch), in which the tide was admitted; and it is also noted that there was a mound, or, breastwork, of dirt.

It is set forth that Ribault left the fort "in some sort defensible"; and, that so well did the men left behind finish it, "that they were now enabled to entrust its protection to one-half of their men." They named it "Charles' Fort," after their king, Charles IX of France. They also named the little creek leading into it, "The River Chenonceau"; and, the main stream, they called, "The River Porte Royal." Their "River Chenonceau" became afterwards known as "Pilot Creek," and is now known, locally, as "Mean's Creek."

Twenty-six men were left behind as a garrison, and they—after a series of mishaps and severe privations—finally built a small boat, and, abandoning the fort, essayed to find their way back to their beloved France.

It is of interest to note they were left in the month of June (Ribault sailed away June 10, 1562), when the climate was mild and pleasant, and all the plants and trees at their best. They were poorly provisioned, and not adequately supplied with the necessary clothing and various articles to render themselves comfortable in cold, or, inclement weather. And in the fall of the year, where they were, the weather turns decidedly chilly, with an abundance of rain.

They had no knowledge of just what the winter would be like, as they were the first white men to try to exist there. And it can easily be imagined how desperate were the straits they found confronting them when, after their first supply of provisions gave out, and they had the misfortune to lose by fire all the neighboring Indians were able to spare them, they found that all they had been able to secure after a trying search was also beginning to show signs of giving out. Indeed, their desperation became so great that they chose a fighting chance to gain home across the high seas in a make-

shift craft rather than to face certain extermination where they were. It must be granted that they were "game," and in the highest sense of the word. Further, it is proudly recorded that before departing, "they embarked their artillery, their forge, and other munitions of war." And although there is lacking any statement of the definite length of their stay, yet six months would seem a fair estimate.

But,—strangest of all!—although it was but seventy years after Columbus had made his first voyage, the survivors were afterwards picked up far out to sea by an English vessel; and after a few of the weaker ones had been put ashore at the point where the craft was bound, the others were carried to England to furnish the sovereign information on their adventures, with a view of helping an expedition he was about to send out.

A CLEVER DRAWING

Ribault was accompanied on his voyage to Port Royal by a cartographer named Le Moyne, who must have been a man of extraordinary talent. For he had the ability to place pretty nearly all of the most important details of their explorations on a single drawing.

It would seem that many interested in the facts of those first explorations have failed to avail themselves of the data so completely given graphically by Le Moyne.

His picture of what they discovered and did in the Port Royal section is a typical example of his great ability in that line. Besides doing all mentioned above, this drawing, or, map, bears on it very clever graphic information relative to the location of the pillar of stone they had planted.

THE DRAWING EXPLAINED

This drawing proves very interesting on close examination. The details shown of the very complicated piece of our coast in the Port Royal area is remarkable for the excellent portrayal of the more essential features. While it is without a scale, and the features are not in their true relative proportions, yet the place is readily recognizable to-day by anyone at all familiar with the locality. And as a perspective drawing it is exceptionally good, especially when consideration is taken of the short length of time they were in the vicinity.

By comparing Le Moyne's work with a recent U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey chart of the same section, it is at once to be seen that he shows a striking picture of the main details; but from the

viewpoint of one who has explored the locality in a small boat, it is more remarkable how well the details are shown as they appear to the eyes in passing.

Above the map, a Latin inscription states, "The Commander of the Frenchmen" (*Gallorum*, *i.e.*, "the men of Gaul," as against *Hispanoli*, or, Spaniards), "erected a column, on which" was engraved "the insignia or seal of the King of France" (*Galliarum*, *i.e.*, the Gallic territories). The numeral "VI" undoubtedly numbers, or, refers to a page, or, documentary number.

On what is now Parris Island appears the words "Cedarum Insidam," or, "Fort of Cedars." For, roughly from the classic Latin "*Insidiæ*," "the soldiers placed within a place"; from "*insidio*," "to sit down in."

In addition to showing the location of the pillar of stone, it is noted the stream encircling the island on which it was placed had been named the "River Liborne" (*Liburm*). The letter "F" standing, of course, for "flumen," or, river. This name, traced back to its derivation, and common use, indicates a swift stream of shallow depth. While the letter "F" placed below the pillar indicates the proximity of another stream of water.

Moreover, besides picturing the nature and location of the wild game, fruits and trees, Indian villages and huts, it is also shown that their fleet consisted of two vessels of that period, one much larger than the other, and, that small sailing boats were used in exploring the streams and islands.

These details are, with one exception, verified by the written accounts. The manuscripts, however, fail to mention the fort was built of cedar. So that it happened that the map, which was examined subsequent to the excavating, verified what had been upturned.

INTERVENING HISTORY OF THE FORT

After the fort was abandoned, it was next mentioned as having been seen by one, William Hilton, who visited the locality a century later—in 1663—and related in his account called his "Relation," of having seen the "ruines of an old Fort, compassing more than half an acre," or, over 21,780 square feet, "of land within the Trenches, which we supposed to be 'Charles' Fort,' built, and so called, by the French, in 1562 . . .," etc.

Investigation has revealed that no use was made of the site of the fort during either the Revolutionary, or, Civil War periods.

Prior to the Civil War, the island was divided into seven plantations, and a row of slave huts stood not far from the site of the fort. And a negro, who was one of the slaves that lived there before the Civil War, who still survives, states no use was ever made of the place, but, rather, that it was avoided as "there was nothing there but bats." For the tide flooded in and around the old moat, cutting the place off into a small island by itself covered with a dense growth of trees and underbrush.

THE MOAT FILLED IN 1917

In 1917, the entire island was taken over by the government and utilized as a place to train our Marines for the World War, and "Charles Fort" became included in the area devoted to training the men for sea service ("The Seagoing Depot"). It then became necessary to use even the small plot of land still cut off by the dirt breastwork and moat. However, it would not have been disturbed even then if its true history had been known. But it was supposed to represent some works thrown up in Civil War days. For current tradition, both locally and elsewhere, fixed the site of Ribault's fort on another island.

All of the underbrush was removed and the dirt parapet used to fill in the moat and level the place off. When this was almost finished, Colonel John Millis, C.E., U.S.A., brought to the attention of the Post Commander the fact that this was really the site of "Charles' Fort." And he was the first to definitely establish it. Photographs and a map were made so as to enable the place to be again readily restored to its former state. Only a number of tents, a mess kitchen, and other small buildings were placed on that spot.

But, fortunately, outside of laying two pipe lines, the soil beneath was not disturbed. The extent to which it was undisturbed appears remarkable, for in places the remains of Ribault's stockade, together with the rusted, hand-wrought iron spikes they used, were only a few inches under the surface.

THE ISLAND HAS AN INTERESTING HISTORY

It was in 1919 that the present writer first became interested in the history of Parris Island, by reason of having found a number of Indian relics: these included a burial mound, the site of their village, a favorite fishing pond, the place where they had made pottery, a quantity of flint arrow and spear heads, etc. And upon looking up its history, the facts about its being "Charles' Fort" were learned,

and the site located. This was independent of the research of Colonel Millis, previously mentioned, although agreeing in results obtained. The only thing to be noted on the site in 1919 was the marks on the trees that showed what had been the height of the parapet. No explorations beneath the surface were made at that time.

II

It was only recently that the present commanding general at Parris Island, Brigadier General Eli K. Cole, U. S. Marine Corps, decided to have the site thoroughly explored with a view of seeing if any relics remained, and to restore it as nearly as possible to what it had formerly been. He took an active interest in the work, and furnished every facility in the way of men and tools to enable the work to be done thoroughly.

THE SITE EXPLORED

The first step was to dig two, deep, narrow trenches at right angles to each other, where it was estimated the fort had stood. This turned out well, for soon the remains of the original stockade was located in three different places, besides a layer of corduroy, the traces of a corner of a building, and a peculiarly arranged deposit of oyster shell. A large quantity of iron spikes of different sizes, were also found, besides many fragments of Indian pottery; while buried five feet in dry sand beneath a good-sized tree, was located a cannon ball five inches in diameter.

REMAINS OF STOCKADE UNCOVERED

By patiently digging out in all directions from the posts first uncovered, it was eventually possible to uncover remains of almost all of the cedar posts that surrounded the fort, giving its outlines and interesting details as to how the stockade was built; how the flanks were protected by little bastions at each corner; and even steps that had been taken to prevent the stockade from being undermined.

BUILT OF LARGE CEDAR POSTS

They wisely built of cedar, one of the most durable of all woods. Due to that fact, and to the protection afforded by the covering sand, a goodly portion of their stockade still exists. But all that was not covered, and even much below the surface, is gone: in some places it was necessary to dig over five feet below the surface before reaching the remains of the posts. Red and white cedar was

used (*Juniperus virginiana*), the posts measuring, in many instances, as much as eighteen inches in diameter.

The spaces between the larger posts was filled by closely aligned smaller ones, very much on the order of a huge wooden fence. And the many large, iron spikes found nearby, show that it was well fastened together. In addition to a flaking bastion on each corner, They also had some sort of a structure, probably a blockhouse, in the front and near the centre.

Well beneath the ground, and to the front of the stockade, they had on all sides, a thick, compact bank of oyster shells, with a two-inch layer running out some distance under the moat. This was probably placed there with the double purpose of keeping the tide from washing away the earth from before and beneath the stockade, and, possibly, to prevent an enemy from tunnelling beneath.

Near the base of the stockade, and to the front, but inclined in and downwards, was found a row of short pieces of cedar, placed like corduroy. This served as a revetment to support the bed of oyster shells and dirt above against the stockade, and keeping it from falling into the moat.

SIZE OF THE FORT

It appears that the fort was originally eighty-two feet wide and ninety-nine feet deep; and that it was afterwards increased by having a section added to it that was ninety-three feet wide and one hundred and three feet deep. For a part, of the dimensions first given, is constructed less substantially than the other part, having a difference in the spacing of the posts, and the depth to which they were placed; and there are double corner posts where the two sections join each other.

The measurements given by Laudonnière were "approximately, sixteen by thirteen fathoms" (or, seventy-eight by ninety-six feet). This differs about three feet on each side from the southern half uncovered. So it would appear that this section to the south was that portion first built, and that the more substantial and better built portion to the north was afterwards added. The total measurements of the fort, as uncovered, were as follows:

Front (west).....	175 feet
Rear (east)	192 feet
North side	103 feet
South side	103 feet

And, no doubt, it was the work incident to increasing the fort to the size given, along with the necessity of the men laboring deep in the soft mud and salt water, that finally led to the mutiny that cost their leader, Captain Albert, his life.

The bastions at the corner were seven feet long on each side, and three feet wide; while the structure in the front towards the centre was fifteen feet square.

The moat was twenty feet wide, about five feet deep, with an embankment to the front twenty feet wide and four feet in height, sloping gently away from the fort.

It is very evident that the men who built this fort meant it to be a powerful and permanent stronghold: it was not, by any means, done as a small, or, incidental, matter. Unquestionably, it was meant to be a mighty wedge upon which to base their claims to the country they found so enchanting. And what remains even now, is mute evidence to the great industry and marked ability of those valiant men.

TRY TO FIND STONE PILLAR

Both Le Moine's picture and the manuscripts, point to Daw Island as the place where the stone column bearing the seal, or arms, of France was erected. Incident to the work on the site of the fort, this island was also explored.

Daw Island is low and marshy, and although it is now deserted, yet in slavehood days it was used for the cultivation of rice. And it now is covered with the old rice paddies, surrounded with great embankments of earth.

Nothing is now there resembling the place described when the stone pillar was placed. This is due, it is presumed, to the fact that all elevated ground was used in making the embankments around the rice fields. So it resulted that no success attended the efforts to find what would have been a most interesting and invaluable relic of Ribault's visit.*

SITE OF THE FORT PRESERVED

Care was taken during the excavating to avoid disturbing the main features of the structure. And after taking a series of photographs, the old cedar stockade was carefully covered over again, to preserve it as it was found. There is no such cedar in that locality any more;

* Subsequent to writing the above, the author was informed by Professor Bolton, Department of History, University of California, that existing manuscripts establish that the Spanish explorer Mendenez subsequently removed and destroyed Ribault's stone pillar.

and even if there were, it is to be doubted if any modern attempt to reconstruct a similar fort could properly grace that spot.

At each corner, and other points necessary to give the details of the fort, concrete pillars have been placed above the original cedar posts. Lengths of chain, linking up these pillars make visible the outline of this interesting work by Ribault's men. The moat and embankment to the front have been restored, and the place converted into an attractive park.

And it is planned to place there a monument bearing a suitable inscription, to commemorate the bravery and hardihood of the men whose deeds so long ago, hallowed this particular spot of our now broad and well-populated country.

HARBORD PORTRAIT PRESENTED TO ARMY AND NAVY CLUB

ON behalf of officers and former officers of the Marine Corps who subscribed to the fund for the purpose, the portrait of Major General James G. Harbord was unveiled and formally presented to the Army and Navy Club at notable ceremonies which took place at the Club building in Washington, on the evening of May 7th. The presentation was made by Secretary of the Navy Denby, who wore for the occasion his uniform as major in the Marine Corps. The portrait was accepted by Colonel C. C. Collins, U. S. Army, Secretary of the Army and Navy Club, and was ordered to be placed in a prominent position in the Club building. A large and distinguished audience witnessed the ceremonies, including officers of the Army and Navy of high rank, as well as nearly the entire officer personnel of the Marine Corps stationed in and around Washington, headed by Major General John A. Lejeune, Commandant of the Corps.

The presentation exercises were opened by Brigadier General George Richards, Chairman of the Harbord Portrait Committee, who acted as chairman, introducing the Secretary of the Navy. General Richards said:

In the club's annual report for 1920, when I was your President, a desire was expressed to preserve in the club's art collection the portraits of distinguished military and naval officers. The idea was that of our good friend, Colonel Taylor, the chairman of the club's art committee. He thought that some of the societies or military orders already formed to commemorate our various wars or those to be formed might wish to present such portraits.

Colonel Taylor arranged for the first gift under this approved plan. That was a portrait of General Chaffee, who commanded the China relief expedition of 1900, a gift of the Military Order of the Dragon, painted after General Chaffee's death.

Colonel Taylor's idea, as well as that of the board of governors, was that a portrait painted from life was of greater value. This thought later came before the committee of officers of the Marine Corps formed to consider the Club's wish. That committee consisted of one officer who had served at San Francisco during the recent war; one who had served at Washington throughout that war; another who had been on duty in France, but not in the front lines; yet another who belonged to the Second Division during the latter part of the war;

one who had fought in Belleau Wood; and the last, but by no means the least, an officer who had entered the Marine Corps for the war and had returned to civil life.

Our committee thus represented every shade of opinion that grew up in the Marine Corps out of conditions following the recent war. The committee worked in harmony from its very inception. Its unanimous decision was that the portrait from the Marine Corps should be one of Major General James G. Harbord, of the United States Army, who led the Marines to victory in Belleau Wood. When the committee brought its recommendation before the commissioned personnel of the Marine Corps, its most difficult duty was to prevent enthusiastic officers from contributing too much.

Gentlemen, the duty of presenting the speaker is a pleasure to me, as well as an honor and distinction. In reality, though, he needs no introduction. His first acquaintance with us was formed as an enlisted man of the Navy during the war with Spain. It was renewed later as an enlisted man of the Marine Corps during the more recent war, where he earned his commission as major. Better opportunities were afforded us to improve upon that acquaintance when he returned to Washington two years ago in his present capacity. This much I can say: His thorough knowledge of the naval service in all of its branches has splendidly equipped him for his present task. He early showed the naval service that loyalty with respect to quality is a fifty-fifty proposition; that the kind of loyalty expected from those he controls is exactly equal to the kind of loyalty he shows them. We have found in him one of those responsive souls that give of their best only to receive it back one thousand fold. Standing before us in his high office, one for all, we can not fail to stand behind him, all for one.

ADDRESS OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Gentlemen, those are dread words, "the speaker of the evening." I come here tonight to attend a friendly gathering with a duty of the utmost sentimental interest to be performed. My extreme delight in being permitted to take part in this ceremony is very closely qualified by humility. I feel that it should be someone that had borne a part in the great deed that made Harbord famous and added so glorious a chapter to the history of the Marine Corps. But, on the other hand, it is not unfitting that one who did not bear a part in the great deeds in the war, but strove in every way at home to help the cause, should be the one to deliver this address. For it proves to you the unity of the thought, not only of those who served under Harbord, but as well those who served in the United States and had no part in the hardships and dangers and glories of the great campaign, in desiring to pay this tribute to the great general. There are so many points of view from which one may discuss this occasion that it is hard to know where to begin. First, the Second Division was a most interesting organization, made up of two regiments of United States Marines and

two regiments of Regular Army troops. One of those regiments, the Ninth Infantry, has had throughout its career in recent years a close association with the Marine Corps. Because, it will not be forgotten by you who know your Army history, that they met at Pekin and Tien-Tsin during the Boxer uprising and fought there side by side. Later in Balangoga it was the Marines who went on an expedition to avenge the massacre of one company of the Ninth there. And then, again, they met in Europe and fought side by side during a great part of the campaign in the Great War. So there was a bond between the Army and Navy and the Fifth and Sixth Marines and the Ninth Infantry that probably did not exist between any other organizations in the service. When the Marine general was required to come back to the United States for physical disability, the question of filling his place was one that was viewed by the Marines, both abroad and at home, with very serious misgiving. Naturally, the Marines, with all their esprit de corps and all their pride and traditions, wanted one of their own. And I think not the least tribute that has been paid to General Harbord is to mention merely the fact that after he was appointed almost immediately he became the idol of the Marine Corps. He won the entire Corps over to him and made them admire him and made them ready to follow him any place. And he displayed in that one of the great attributes of leadership, proved himself not alone a highly trained professional soldier, but a natural-born leader of men. He did this merely by entering into the spirit that he had been born to command. I remember the incident when General Neville went to General Harbord with two Marine emblems in his hand and said to him, "Here, we think it is time that you should be wearing these," and he wore them thereafter during the campaign in which he commanded the Marine Brigade. And he never ceased to profess his confidence in his command. Harbord is a very extraordinary man, a very unusual man, and a very typical American soldier. He is a citizen soldier, for, as you probably all know, he enlisted first and worked his way up from the ranks. He was born in '66 in Illinois; then he moved to Kansas and went through the Kansas Agricultural College. After he had graduated he became an instructor in that college and so remained for three years, and then he enlisted in the United States Infantry and thereafter worked his way through all the non-commissioned ranks up to a commission in 1891. There, again, he showed his ability, for in those days to hold all the non-commissioned grades and be commissioned a second lieutenant in two years was a demonstration of capacity not very frequently seen. Then in '98 he was in Cuba and in various parts of the United States with Torrey's Rough Riders; after that in Cuba again and in the Philippines; then in the United States again at the War Department and at the War College. Then his education was complete as a soldier. It was merely that of an American man who had the attributes of a commander. And in France came the great opportunity, when he commanded the Marines in their first glorious

hour in the terrible battle of Belleau Wood. And it is a most striking thing that he so completely won the confidence of the Marines that today there is not a dissenting voice throughout the Marine Corps to giving a token of the Marine's appreciation to this Club. And I like the idea, both because I am and was a Marine during the war and because I like this demonstration of amity between two services. It is a thing that we all strive for; it is a thing that makes for the best interests of the United States and a thing that is sometimes forgotten. After all, we are all in uniform, when we are in uniform, for one great purpose—for the defense of the country; and it does behoove every man to see that proper respect shall be paid by one branch of the service to the other and to encourage that unity of purpose, to bring about the feeling of brotherhood that all should have in the military service, no matter where serving or under which banner they may be serving. I am not going to take your time to eulogize General Harbord. Most of you know him as well as I do. You in the uniform of the U. S. Marines feel for him the same respect that I do. Many of you are as proud as I am that it was Harbord who commanded the Marines at Belleau Wood. And on behalf of the commissioned rank of the United States Marine Corps I present to the Army and Navy Club this portrait of General Harbord, which I hope will always be an inspiration to us all.

Colonel C. C. Collins, U. S. Army, Secretary of the Army and Navy Club, in the absence of Rear Admiral Joseph Strauss, U. S. Navy, President, who was unable to be present, in accepting the portrait, said :

Mr. Secretary, General Lejeune, and officers of the Marine Corps, it is my pleasant duty to accept this splendid portrait of one of our most distinguished members and to express to you the sincere thanks and appreciation of the board of governors and members of the Club for placing it in our possession. I can assure you that so long as this Club is in existence we will care for and preserve this painting of General Harbord. I hope you will transmit the thanks of the Club to those officers of the Marine Corps who aided in securing this valuable and highly prized addition to our collection of treasures, but who are prevented from being present tonight to take part in its presentation.

GENERAL LEJEUNE'S REMARKS

I will not endeavor to describe General Harbord's services to the nation, as Major Denby has already given us a most vivid and eloquent portrayal of his record.

I will, however, say a few words concerning the significance of this occasion. Primarily, the presentation of this portrait to the Club by officers and former officers of the Marine Corps is significant of the affection and admiration we have for General Harbord. This offering comes, not only from those he commanded during the epochal and

tremendous days at Belleau Woods and Soissons, when the ties that bound them together were cemented with the blood of over 7500 Marines, but it is felt very deeply also by those of us who knew him at other times or served with him on other occasions.

There is, too, another significance connected with this portrait, concerning which I will speak briefly. I refer to the insignia borne on the frame. We see there the great seals of the Army and Navy, the device of the Marine Corps, and the insignia of the Second Division. I feel that the union of these insignia is symbolic of the unity and the harmony which should exist within and between all branches of the armed services. We have unity of mission: why, then, should we not always have harmony of purpose?

This unity, this harmony, and this mission to which I have referred are typified by the Second Division insignia, which is borne, not only on the frame, but on the sleeve of the overcoat as well. It consists of a star and Indian head on a background. The background indicates the unit, the regiment, the battalion, the detachment, and the corps. All are different; all had their special characteristics; all were intended to represent the spirit of friendly competition which animated every organization of this great division, but all belonged to the star and Indian head. All together constituted one great harmonious organization. Then, too, the star is the emblem of faithfulness and constancy. It shines always. Night after night it sends forth its rays into the blackness of space, and we know it is there, no matter how dark be the clouds or how heavy be the storm which hides it. It shines forth night after night like a loyal and faithful spirit. Then, too, its five points signify unity; all are necessary; the star is imperfect if one be missing. Then, the Indian is the emblem of the fighting man. It typifies skill, endurance, and valor. Thus we read the meaning of the insignia. The spirit of the fighting man is combined with the spirit of loyalty, constancy, and unity.

Can we not find a lesson here? The officers of the armed services represent no locality; we are not identified with the north, the south, the east, or the west; we stand for no factions, whether they be racial, religious, or political. We are Americans only, charged by our oaths to support the Constitution and to protect and maintain the independence of the Nation. Let us, first, however, be sure that we cast out the beam of factionalism from our own eyes. Let us have unity within the organizations to which we belong, judging no man harshly, but striving for the common good. Let us banish all bitterness of heart between those who took part in the stress of battle and those less fortunate ones who strived faithfully, even though obscurely, here or elsewhere. Let us rid ourselves of all corps jealousies and all unseemly striving by individuals, corps, or organizations. Let us all stand together for the common welfare of all branches of the armed services and the defense of our beloved country from the attacks of all foes whether they be from within or from without.

The President, who had been invited to attend, was unable to accept and wrote as follows:

DEAR GENERAL RICHARDS:

I am very grateful to you and the members of your committee for the invitation to attend the presentation of the portrait of General Harbord at the Army and Navy Club this evening, and I am sorry it is not possible for me to accept. This portrait being the gift of the Marine Corps conveys, not only a fine and thoroughly deserved compliment to General Harbord, but beyond that it suggests the particularly commendable amiability which marks the relationship among the different branches of the service. I recall the fact that this very sentiment of generous coöperation and mutual helpfulness was precisely the factor which so greatly increased the efficiency of all branches of the service during the World War. I am particularly pleased that the desire to recognize General Harbord's service should have been made the occasion for this testimony to the good feeling which prevails. His command, I believe, embraced units from all the branches of the armed forces, and the splendid record which it made is the best proof that he so richly deserves the compliment that is being extended.

Most sincerely, yours,

WARREN G. HARDING.

Preceding the presentation a dinner was given at the Army and Navy Club to General Harbord, the guests including those who later attended the presentation exercises.

General Harbord did not attend the presentation exercises, but, at the suggestion of General Richards, Colonel Collins appointed a committee to invite him to witness the motion pictures taken of the Second Division and of the Fourth Brigade of Marines in action at Belleau Wood and elsewhere in France, which were exhibited after the ceremonies ended.

The committee in charge of the portrait presentation was composed of the Secretary of the Navy, Brigadier General Logan Feland, Brigadier General Henry C. Haines, Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Matthews (treasurer), Major William F. Bevan (secretary), and Brigadier General George Richards (chairman).

On the completion of his work, the Treasurer of the Harbord Portrait Committee forwarded to the *GAZETTE* a copy of his report, with the request that it be published for the information of contributors. Contributions received after the completion of the work have been returned to donors.

HEADQUARTERS U. S. MARINE CORPS

Washington, 8 May, 1923.

Report of the Treasurer of the Harbord Portrait Committee

The undersigned, Treasurer of the Harbord Portrait Committee, hereby acknowledges receipt of contributions to the Harbord Portrait Fund, as per list of subscribers to this fund inclosed herewith, and takes this means of conveying to each of the subscribers, on behalf of the committee, its appreciation of the very general response made to request for subscriptions and of the amounts subscribed.

The total amount received from subscribers has been disbursed in payment of artist's commission for painting portrait, in payment for frame for portrait, in payment for printing of circulars sent out soliciting subscriptions, for stationery, for postage, and for no other purpose.

A splendid portrait of General Harbord has been obtained, together with frame which was designed by the artist who painted the portrait. The portrait was presented to the Army and Navy Club on Monday evening, May 7th, with appropriate ceremony.

HUGH MATTHEWS,
Lieut. Col. A.Q.M., U.S.M.C.,
Treasurer, Harbord Portrait Committee.

We, the undersigned, have audited the accounts of the Treasurer of the Harbord Portrait Committee and find all receipts and disbursements supported by proper vouchers, that the receipts and expenditures balance and that the account is closed.

GEORGE RICHARDS,
Brig. Gen., U.S.M.C.,
Chairman, Harbord Portrait Committee.
LOGAN FELAND,
Brig. Gen., U.S.M.C.,
Member of Committee.

List of subscribers to the Harbord Portrait Fund, showing amounts subscribed by each, arranged alphabetically.

Adams, George F., Captain	\$1.00	Anthony, Robert C., Captain	\$2.00
Adams, Henry F., 1st Lt.	2.00	Archer, Percy F., Major	2.00
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Coyle, Wm. R., Late Major	2.00	Duffy, John F., Captain	2.00
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Craig, Chas. A., Late 1st Lt.	2.00	Durell, Anthony W., Late 2nd Lt.	2.00
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Crist, Arthur P., Major, ret.	2.00	ret.	2.00
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Hakala, Edwin U., 1st Lt.	2.00	Horan, Leo. F. S., 1st Lt.	2.00
Hale, Henry N., 1st Lt., ret.	2.00	Horton, J. R., Major	2.00
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OF AUGUST 24, 1912

Of THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, published quarterly at
Philadelphia, Pa., for October 1, 1922

Washington, D. C. } ss.

Before me, an Adjutant and Inspector in the U. S. Marine Corps (authorized to administer oaths), personally appeared John H. Craige who having been duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he is the editor of THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, and that the following is, to the best of his knowledge and belief, a true statement of the ownership, management (and if a daily paper, the circulation), etc., of the aforesaid publication for the date shown in the above caption, required by the Act of August 24, 1912, embodied in section 443, Postal Laws and Regulations, printed on the reverse of this form, to wit:

1. That the names and addresses of the publisher, editor, managing editor, and business managers are:
Publisher, Marine Corps Association, 227 South 6th St., Philadelphia, Pa.
Editor, John H. Craige.
Managing Editor: None.
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2. That the owners are: (Give names and addresses of individual owners, or, if a corporation, give its name and the names and addresses of stockholders owning or holding 1 per cent. or more of the total amount of stock.)
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3. That the known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 per cent. or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities are: (If there are none, so state.) None.
4. That the two paragraphs next above, giving the names of the owners, stockholders, and security holders, if any, contain not only the list of stockholders and security holders as they appear upon the books of the company but also, in cases where the stockholder or security holder appears upon the books of the company as trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person or corporation for whom such trustee is acting, is given; also that the said two paragraphs contain statements embracing affiant's full knowledge and belief as to the circumstances and conditions under which the stockholders and security holders who do not appear upon the books of the company as trustees, hold stock and securities in a capacity other than that of a bona fide owner; and this affiant has no reason to believe that any other person, association, or corporation, has any interest direct or indirect in the said stock, bonds, or other securities than as so stated by him.
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(Signed) JOHN H. CRAIGE

Sworn to and subscribed before me this first day of October, 1922.

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